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Abstract
We provide the first social choice theory approach to the question of what constitutes a
community in a social network. Inspired by social choice theory in voting and other contexts
[2], we start from an abstract social network framework, called preference networks [3]; these
consist of a finite set of members and a vector giving a total ranking of the members in the
set for each of them (representing the preferences of that member).
Within this framework, we axiomatically study the formation and structures of commu-
nities. Our study naturally involves two complementary approaches. In the first, we apply
social choice theory and define communities indirectly by postulating that they are fixed
points of a preference aggregation function obeying certain desirable axioms. In the sec-
ond, we directly postulate desirable axioms for communities without reference to preference
aggregation, leading to a natural set of eight community axioms.
These two approaches allow us to formulate and analyze community rules. We prove a
taxonomy theorem that provides a structural characterization of the family of those commu-
nity rules that satisfies all eight axioms. The structure is actually quite beautiful: the family
satisfying all eight axioms forms a bounded lattice under the natural intersection and union
operations of community rules. The taxonomy theorem also gives an explicit characterization
of the most comprehensive community rule and the most selective community rule consis-
tent with all community axioms. This structural theorem is complemented with a complexity
result: we show that while identifying a community by the selective rule is straightforward,
deciding if a subset satisfies the comprehensive rule is coNP-complete. Our studies also shed
light on the limitations of defining community rules solely based on preference aggregation.
In particular, we show that many aggregation functions lead to communities which violate
at least one of our community axioms. These include any aggregation function satisfying
Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternative axiom as well as commonly used aggregation
schemes like the Borda count or generalizations thereof. Finally, we give a polynomial-time
rule consistent with seven axioms and weakly satisfying the eighth axiom.
∗Supported in part by NSF grants CCF-1111270 and CCF-0964481 and by a Simons Investigator Award from
the Simons Foundation.
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1 Introduction: Formulating Preferences and Communities
A fundamental problem in network analysis is the characterization and identification of subsets
of nodes in a network that have significant structural coherence. This problem is usually studied
in the context of community identification and network clustering. Like other inverse problems
in machine learning, this one is conceptually challenging: There are many possible ways to
measure the degree of coherence of a subset and many possible interpretations of affinities to
model network data. As a result, various seemingly reasonable/desirable conditions to qualify
a subset as a community have been studied in the literature [15, 21, 18, 11, 3, 10, 8, 17, 22, 6].
The fact that there are an exponential number of candidate subsets to consider makes direct
comparison of different community characterizations quite difficult.
Among the challenges in the study of communities in a social and information network are
the following two basic mathematical problems:
• Extension of individual affinities/preferences to community coherence: A (so-
cial) network usually represents pairwise interactions among its members, while the notion
of communities is defined over its larger subsets. Thus, to model the formation of com-
munities, we need a set of consistent rules to extend the pairwise relations or individual
preferences to community coherence.
• Inference of missing links: Since networks typically are sparse, we also need methods
to properly infer the missing links from the given network data.
In this paper, we take what we believe is a novel and principled approach to the problem of
community identification. Inspired by the classic work in social choice theory [2], we propose an
axiomatic approach towards understanding network communities, providing both a framework
for comparison of different community characterizations, and relating community identification
to well-studied problems in social choice theory [2]. Here, we focus on the problem of defining
community rules and coherence measures from individual preferences presented in the input
social/information network, but we think that this study will also provide the foundation for an
axiomatic approach to the problem of inferring missing links. We plan to address this second
problem in a subsequent paper, which will use this paper as a foundation.
Through the lens of axiomatization, we examine both mathematical and complexity-theoretic
structures of communities that satisfy a community rule or a set of community axioms. We also
study the stability of network communities, and design algorithms for identifying and enumer-
ating communities with desirable properties.
While the study initiated here is conceptual, we believe it will ultimately enable a more
principled way to choose among community formation models for interpretation of current ex-
periments, and also suggest future experiments.
1.1 Preference Networks
Before presenting the highlights of our work, we first define an abstract social network framework
which enables us to focus on the axiomatic study of community rules. This framework is inspired
by social choice theory [2] and was first used in [3] in the context of community identification for
modeling social networks with complete preference information. We will refer to each instance
of this framework as a preference network. Below, for a non-empty finite set V , let L(V ) denote
2
the set of all linear orders on V , represented, e.g., by the set of all bijections pi : V → [1 : |V |],
where as usual, [n : m] is the set {n, n+ 1, , . . . ,m}. Alternatively, pi can be represented by the
ordered list pi = [x1, x2, . . . , x|V |], where xi ∈ V is such that pi(xi) = i; in our notation, pi(x)
thus represents the rank of x in the ordered list pi = [x1, x2, . . . , x|V |].
Definition 1 (Preference Networks). A preference network is a pair A = (V,Π), where V is a
non-empty finite set and Π is a preference profile on V , defined as an element Π = {pii}i∈V ∈
L(V )V . Here pii specifies the total ranking
1 of V in the order of i’s preference: ∀s, u, v ∈ V , s
prefers u to v, denoted by u ≻πs v, if and only if pis(u) < pis(v).
As argued in [3], a real-life social network may be viewed as sparse, observed social interac-
tions of an underlying latent preference network. In this view, the communities of a preference
network may be considered to be the ground truth set of potential communities in its observed
social network.
1.2 Highlights of the Paper
Our main contribution is an axiomatic framework for studying community formation in prefer-
ence networks, and mathematical, complexity-theoretic, and algorithmic investigation of com-
munity structures in this framework. Our work on axiomatization of network communities can
be organized into two related parts: (1) communities as fixed points of social choice aggregation
functions; and (2) communities via direct axiomatic characterization. In the second part, we
specify eight axioms we would like the communities to obey, and find conditions under which
such communities exist. In the first part, we specify social choice aggregation functions for
which the communities will be fixed points; this first method allows for an “indirect” axiomatic
characterization in that the aggregation functions themselves could be taken to obey axioms
[2, 24], which would then indirectly characterize the communities which result as fixed points.
Communities as fixed points of social choice
Our approach of starting from preference networks to study communities naturally connects
community formation to social choice theory [2], which provides a theoretical framework for
understanding the problem of combining individual preferences into a collective preference or
decision. In this first part of our analysis, we use preference aggregation functions studied in
social choice theory [2] to characterize communities by defining communities as fixed points of
a preference aggregation function.
Since real-world voting schemes and preference aggregation functions do not always produce
a total order, we will use the following notation in the definition below. Let L(V ) denote the
set of all ordered partitions of V . For a σ ∈ L(V ), for i, j ∈ V , we use i ≻σ j to denote that i is
strictly preferred to j (that is, i and j belong to different partitions, and the partition containing
1 In broader settings, one may want to consider preferences that allow indifference or partially ordered prefer-
ences, or both. One may also model a social network by a cardinal affinity network that specify each member’s
preference by a weighted affinity vector, for example with weights from [0, 1] where 1 and 0, respectively, represent
the highest and lowest preferences. To distinguish ordinal and cardinal preferences, we refer to the latter as an
affinity network. Both models are referred to as affinity systems in [3]. For simplicity of exposition, we first focus
on preference networks. In Section 7, we discuss the possible extension of our framework.
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i is ahead of the partition containing j in σ). In this case, we also say j ≺σ i. We will use i σ j
to denote that i ≻σ j or i and j are in the same partition.
To continue, we need some notions motivated by social choice theory. In this context, V
will be considered a set of “candidates”. We’ll also need a set of possible voters, S, which
is assumed to be a countable set – if not otherwise specified, we identify S with the positive
integers N. With a slight abuse of notation, we denote the union of L(V )S over all non-empty
finite S ⊆ S by L(V )∗. A preference aggregation function is then defined to be an arbitrary
function F : L(V )∗ → L(V ). Given a non-empty finite set of voters S and a preference profile
ΠS = {pis : s ∈ S} ∈ L(V )
S , the image F (ΠS) is called the aggregated preference
2 of S.
Definition 2. (Communities as Fixed Points of Social Choice) Let A = (V,Π) be a
preference network, F : L(V )∗ → L(V ) be a preference aggregation function, and ∅ 6= S ⊆ V . S
is called a community of A with respect to F if and only if u ≻F (ΠS) v, ∀u ∈ S, v ∈ V − S.
The function CF mapping A into the set of communities defined above is called the fixed
point rule with respect to F . If F is not specified, i.e., if there exists an F such that C = CF ,
we call C simply a fixed point rule.
Informally, this definition says that a community is a subset S ⊆ V such that, when we aggre-
gate the preferences of all its members, the resulting aggregated preference puts the members S
as the top |S| elements.3 In other words, under the aggregation function F , the members of the
community “vote” for themselves. Thus, S is a fixed point of its aggregated preference. The com-
munity characterization of Definition 2 generalizes the following concept of self-determination
of [3]:
Definition 3. (B3CT Communities) Let A = (V,Π) be a preference network. For ∅ 6= S ⊆ V
and i ∈ V , let φΠS (i) denote the number of votes that member i would receive if each member s ∈ S
was casting one vote for each of its |S| most preferred members according to its preference pis.
In other words, φΠS (i) = |{s : (s ∈ S) & (pis(i) ∈ [1 : |S|])}| . Then, S is B
3CT-self-determined
if everyone in S receives more votes from S then everyone outside S.
It is easy to see that the B3CT voting rule is an instance of a fixed-point rule, with preference
aggregation function F defined by v ≻F (ΠS) w iff φ
Π
S (v) > φ
Π
S (w).
We will also refer to a community according to Definition 2 as an F -self-determined commu-
nity. We are particularly interested in those aggregation functions that satisfy various axioms in
social choice theory [2], since this enables us to utilize established social choice theory to study
all conceivable self-determination community rules within one unified framework. For example,
it allows us to reduce the fairness analysis for community formation to the fairness of preference
aggregation functions.
Arrow’s celebrated impossiblility theorem and subsequent work in social choice theory [2]
point to both challenges and exciting opportunities for understanding communities in prefer-
ence networks. Recall that Arrow’s theorem states that for n > 2, no (strictly linear) preference
aggregation function satisfies all of the following three axiomatic conditions: Unanimity, Inde-
pendence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and Non-Dictatorship (see Section 2 for definitions.) On the
2Note that in our notation without further requiring F to satisfy additional conditions, the labels in S matter:
e.g., even if pi1 and pi2 are the same permutation of [n], the values of F (Π{1}) and F (Π{2}) can be different.
3In the case of ties, we allow for ties among the top |S| members, as well as among the lower ranked members,
but not between the top |S| members and anyone below.
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other hand, preference aggregation functions exist if one relaxes any of these conditions. For
instance, the well-known Borda count [23] is a unanimous voting method with no dictators.
In this paper, we will examine the impact of preference aggregation functions on the structure
of the self-determined communities that they define, as well as the limitations of formulating
community rules solely based on preference aggregation. See below for more discussion.
Communities via direct axiomatic characterization
In this second approach, we will use a more direct axiomatic characterization to study network
communities. To this end, we use a set-theoretical community function as a means to characterize
a community rule.
Definition 4 (Community Functions). Let A denote the set of all preference networks. A
community function is a function C that maps a preference network A = (V,Π) to a characteristic
function of non-empty subsets of V . In other words, C(A) ⊆ 22
V −{∅} is an indicator function of
2V−{∅}. We say a subset S ⊆ V is a community in a preference network A = (V,Π) according
to a community function C if and only if S ∈ C(A). To simplify our notation, for A = (V,Π)
we often write C(V,Π) instead of C((V,Π)).
We use axioms to state properties, such as fairness and consistency, that a desirable commu-
nity function should have when applied to all preference networks. An example is the property
that the community function should be isomorphism-invariant: Here an isomorphism between
two preference networks A = (V,Π) and A′ = (V ′,Π′) is a bijection σ : V → V ′ such that
Π′ = σ(Π), i.e., such that for all s, v ∈ V , pi′σ(s)(σ(v)) = pis(v), and two preference networks A
and A′ are isomorphic to each other if there exists such an isomorphism. Isomorphism invariance
then requires that for any pair of isomorphic preference networks A = (V,Π) and A′ = (V ′,Π′)
and any isomorphism σ between A and A′, if S ⊂ V is a community in A, then σ(S) should still
be a community in the A′. Another example is the property of monotonic characterization: If S
is a community in A = (V,Π), then S should remain a community in every preference network
A′ = (V,Π′) such that for all u, s ∈ S and v ∈ V , if u ≻πs v then u ≻π′s v.
In Section 2, we propose a natural set of eight desirable community axioms. Six of them, in-
cluding both examples above, provide a positive characterization of communities. These axioms
concern the consistency, fairness, and robustness of a community function, as well as the com-
munity structures when a preference network is embedded in a larger preference network. The
other two axioms address the necessary stability and self-approval conditions that a community
should satisfy.
Constructing and Analyzing Community Rules
While Definition 4 is convenient for the study of the mathematical structure of our theory,
community identification is a computational problem as much as a mathematical problem. Thus,
it is desirable that communities can be characterized by a constructive community function C
that is:
• Consistent: C satisfies all (or nearly all) axioms;
• Constructive: Given a preference network A = (V,Π), and a subset S ⊆ V , one can
determine in polynomial-time (in n = |V |) if S ∈ C(A).
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• Samplable: One can efficiently obtain a random sample of C(A).
• Enumerable: One can efficiently enumerate C(A), for instance, in time O(nk · |C(A)|) for
a constant k.
Our two axiomatic approaches allow us to formulate a rich family of community rules and analyze
their properties. Using the fixed-point rule, we can define a constructive community function
based on any polynomial-time computable aggregation function. Alternatively, we can use one
axiom or a set of axioms as a community rule. We can also define a community rule by the
intersection of a fixed-point rule and a set of axioms. In this paper, we aim to characterize the
community rules that satisfy a set of “reasonable” axioms, and address the basic questions:
• Is there an aggregation function leading to a community rule satisfying this set
of “reasonable” axioms?
• What is the complexity of the community rules based on these axioms?
• How are different community rules satisfying our axioms related to each other?
For example, given two community rules C1 and C2 satisfying our axioms, does
the rule C defined by C(A) := C1(A) ∩ C2(A) obey our axioms as well?
Structural and Complexity-Theoretic Results
Our main structural result is a taxonomy theorem that provides a complete characterization
of the most comprehensive community rule and the most selective community rule consistent
with all our community axioms. This result illustrates an interesting contrast to the classic
axiomatization result of Arrow [2] and the more recent result of Kleinberg on clustering [9]
that inspired our work. Unlike voting or clustering where the basic axioms lead to impossiblity
theorems, the preference network framework offers a natural community rule, which we call the
Clique Rule, that is intuitively fair, consistent, and stable, although selective (See Section 4
for more details): S is a community according the Clique Rule iff each member of S prefers
every member of S over every non-member. Indeed the Clique Rule satisfies all our axioms.
Our analysis then leads us to a community rule which is consistent with all axioms – we call
it the Comprehensive Rule – such that for any community rule C satisfying all axioms and all
preference network A, Cclique(A) ⊆ C(A) ⊆ Ccomprehensive(A). Perhaps more interesting, under
the natural operations of union and intersections, the set of all community rules satisfying all
our axioms becomes a lattice with Cclique(A) and Ccomprehensive(A) forming a lower and upper
bound, respectively.
We complement this structural theorem with a complexity result: we show that while iden-
tifying a community by the Clique Rule is straightforward, it is coNP-complete to determine if
a subset satisfies the comprehensive rule.
Our studies also shed light on the limitations of formulating community rules solely based
on preference aggregation. In particular, we show that many aggregation functions lead to
communities which violate at least one of our community axioms. We give two impossibility-like
theorems.
1. Any fixed-point rule based on commonly used aggregation schemes like Borda count or
generalizations thereof – such as the B3CT self-determination rule – is inconsistent with
(at least) one of our axioms.
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2. For any aggregation function satisfying Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternative
axiom, its fixed-point rule must violate one of our axioms.
Finally, using our direct axiomatic framework, we analyze the following natural constructive
community function inspired by preference aggregations.
Definition 5 (Harmonious Communities). A non-empty subset S ⊆ V is a harmonious com-
munity of a preference network A = (V,Π) if for all u ∈ S and v ∈ V − S, the majority of
{pis : s ∈ S} prefer u over v.
We will show that the harmonious community rule is consistent with seven axioms and
satisfies a weaker form of the eighth axiom. In addition, various stable versions of harmonious
communities (see the discussion below) enjoy some degree of samplablility and enumerability.
Stability of Communities and Algorithms
In real-world social interactions, some communities are more stable or durable than others
when people’s interests and preferences evolve over time. For example, some music bands stay
together longer than others. Inspired by the work of [3] and Mishra et al. [11] on modeling this
phenomenon, we examine the impact of stability on the community structure.
To motivate our discussion, we first recall the main definition and result of [3]:
Definition 6. For 0 ≤ β < α ≤ 1, a non-empty subset S ⊆ V is an (α, β)−B3CT community
in A = (V,Π) iff φΠS (u) ≥ α · |S| ∀u ∈ S and φ
Π
S (v) < β · |S| ∀v 6∈ S.
It was shown in [3] that, in any preference network, there are only polynomially many stable
B3CT communities when the parameters α, β are constants, and they can be enumerated in
polynomial time, showing that the strength of community coherence has both structural and
computational implications.
In Section 6, we consider several stability conditions in our axiomatic community framework.
In one direction, we examine the structure of the communities (defined by a fixed-point commu-
nity rule) that remain self-determined even after a certain degree of perturbation in its members’
preferences. In this context, for example, we can reinterpret the B3CT-stability defined above as
follows: A subset S ⊆ V is an (α, β)−B3CT community in a preference network A if it remains
self-determined when |S| · (α− β)/2 members of S make arbitrary changes to their preferences.
In the other direction, we consider some notions of stability derived directly from the social-
choice based community framework where members of a community separate themselves from
the rest. We can further use the separability as a measure of the community strength and sta-
bility to capture the intuition that stronger communities are also themselves more integrated.
As a concrete example, we show in Section 6 that there are a quasi-polynomial number of stable
harmonious communities for all these notions of stability. This result demonstrates that there
exists a constructive community function that essentially satisfies all our axioms, whose stable
communities are quasi-polynomial-time samplable and enumerable.
2 Coherent Communities: Axioms
In this section, we define our eight core axioms, give a more formal treatment of social choice
axioms, and examine several properties of community rules and the relations these have with
each other.
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2.1 Lexicographic Preference
The following notion will be crucial in several parts of this paper, and is implicitly used in our
first two axioms below.
Definition 7 (Lexicographical Preferences). Given a preference network (V,Π) and two non-
empty disjoint subsets G and G′ of equal size, we say that s ∈ V lexicographically prefers G′
over G if there exists a bijection fs : G→ G
′ such that fs(u) ≻πs u for all u ∈ G.
We say that a group T ⊂ V lexicographically prefers G′ over G if every member s ∈ T
lexicographically prefers G′ to G, i.e., if there exists a set of bijections {fs : G → G
′ | s ∈ T}
such that fs(u) ≻πs u for all u ∈ G and all s ∈ T .
Note that, in contrast to the standard lexicographical order, lexicographical preference is
only a partial order. The notion is motivated by the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Let pi ∈ L(V ), let G and G′ be disjoint subsets of V with |G| = |G′|. Let G[i]
(and G′[i]) be the ith highest ranked element of G (and G′) according to pi. Then there exists
a bijection f : G −→ G′ such that for all g ∈ G, f(g) ≻π g if and only for all i ∈ [1 : |G|],
G′[i] ≻π G[i].
Proof. Suppose f satisfies the condition of the proposition. Then G′[1] π f(G[1]) ≻π G[1].
If G′[1] 6= f(G[1]), define h to be the bijection on G′ which exchanges G′[1] and f(G[1]), and
define f˜ = g ◦ f . Then G′[1] = f˜(G[1]) ≻π G[1] while f˜ still satisfies the condition of the
proposition. Removing G[1] from G and G′[1] from G′, we continue by induction to prove the
only if statement. The if statement is obvious - just define f by f(G[i]) = G′[i].
2.2 Axioms for Community Functions
For the following definitions, fix a ground set V and a community function C.
Axiom 1 (Group Stability (GS)). If Π is a preference profile over V and S ∈ C(V,Π), then S is
group stable with respect to Π. Here a subset S ⊂ V is called group stable with respect to Π
if for all non-empty G ( S, all G′ ⊂ V − S of the same size as G, and all tuples of bijections,
(fi : G→ G
′, i ∈ S −G), there exists s ∈ S −G, u ∈ G such that u ≻πs fs(u).
This axiom provides a type of game-theoretic stability [14, 13, 4, 19, 20], and states that
no subgroup in a community can be replaced by an equal-size group of non-members that are
lexicographically preferred by the remainder of the community members. For instance, if the
subgroup is of size 1, this means that there is no outsider that is universally preferred to this
member, excluding that member’s own opinion. On the other end of the spectrum, if the
subgroup is all but one person, then group stability states that there must be someone from
that member’s top choices, and thus represents a type of individual rationality condition. Note
that the set V is vacuously group stable for all Π.
Axiom 2 (Self-Approval (SA)). If Π is a preference profile over V , and S ∈ C(V,Π) then S is
self-approving with respect to Π. Here a subset S ⊂ V is called self-approving with respect
to Π if for all G′ ⊆ V − S of the same size as S, and all tuples of bijections (fi : S → G
′, i ∈ S)
there exists s, u ∈ S, such that u ≻πs fs(u).
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Axiom SA uses the same partial ordering of groups as the first, and requires that there is no
outside group of the same size as S which is lexicographically preferred to S by everyone in S.
It generalizes the intuition that a singleton should be a community only if that member prefers
herself to everyone else. Note that any set S of size larger than |V |/2 is vacuously self-approving
for all Π.
Axiom 3 (Anonymity (A)). Let S, S′ ⊂ V and Π,Π′ be such S′ = σ(S) and Π′ = σ(Π) for some
permutation σ : V → V . Then S ∈ C(V,Π)⇐⇒ S′ ∈ C(V,Π′).
A staple axiom, Anonymity, states that labels should have no effect on a community function.
Axiom 4 (Monotonicity (Mon)). Let S ⊂ V . If Π and Π′ are such that for all s ∈ S
u ≻π′s v =⇒ u ≻πs v for all u ∈ S, v ∈ V
then S ∈ C(V,Π′) =⇒ S ∈ C(V,Π).
The Axiom Monotonicity states that, if a member of a community gets promoted without
negatively impacting other members, then that subset must remain a community. Thus this
axiom reflects the fact that high positions imply greater affinities towards those people. Note
that Mon also allows non-members to change arbitrarily, as long as their positions relative to
any members remains the same or worse.
Axiom 5 (Coherence Robustness of Non-Members (CRNM)). Let S ⊂ V . If Π and Π′ are such
that for all s, t ∈ S
v ≻π′s w ⇐⇒ v ≻π′t w for all v,w /∈ S
and
pi′s(u) = pis(u) for all u ∈ S,
then S ∈ C(V,Π′) =⇒ S ∈ C(V,Π).
Axiom 6 (Coherence Robustness of Members (CRM)). Let S ⊂ V . If Π and Π′ are such that for
all s, t ∈ S we have
u ≻π′s w ⇐⇒ u ≻π′t w for all u,w ∈ S
and
pi′s(v) = pis(v) for all v /∈ S,
then S ∈ C(V,Π′) =⇒ S ∈ C(V,Π).
The two Coherence Robustness Axioms reflect the fact that, if community members agree
about their preferences concerning either members or non-members, they are less likely to be
a community. In the case of non-members, agreement implies that some non-member is more
preferred and therefore more likely to break up the community. Contrariwise, in the case of
members, agreement implies some member is less preferred and more likely to be ousted.
Axiom 7 (World Community (WC)). For all preference profiles Π, V ∈ C(V,Π).
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To state the next axiom, we define the projection A|V ′ of a preference network A = (V,Π)
onto a subset V ′ ⊂ V as the preference network A|V ′ = (V
′, Π|V ′) where Π|V ′ = {pi
′
s}s∈V ′ is
defined by setting pi′s to be the linear order on L(V
′) which keeps the relative ordering of all
members of V ′, i.e., for all s, u, v ∈ V ′, u ≻π′s v ⇐⇒ u ≻πs v. We say that A
′ is embedded into
A if A′ = A|V ′ for some V
′ ⊂ V .
Axiom 8 (Embedding (Emb)). If A′ = (V ′,Π′) is embedded into A = (V,Π) and pii(j) = pi
′
i(j)
for all i, j ∈ V ′ then
C(A′) = C(A) ∩ 2V
′
.
In other words, if a network (V ′,Π′) is embedded into a larger network (V,Π) in such a way
that, with respect to the preferences in the larger network, the members of the smaller network
prefer each other over everyone else, then the set of communities in the larger network which
are subsets of V ′ is identical to the set of communities in the smaller network.
Note that, in contrast to the first seven axioms, which refer to a fixed finite ground set V ,
the last axiom links different grounds sets to each other. Strictly speaking, a community rule C
is therefore not just one function C : (V,Π) 7−→ 22
V −{∅}, but a collection of such functions, one
for each finite set V contained in some countable reference set, say the natural numbers 4 N. In
a similar way, preference aggregation is not defined by a single function F : L∗(V )→ L(V ) but
by a set of such functions, one for each finite V contained in the reference set. However, when
we define preference aggregation, we usually define it for a fixed V , leaving the dependence on
V implicit.
Note also that together, Axioms Anonymity and Embedding imply the isomorphism invariance
discussed in the introduction.
2.3 Properties of Social Choice Axioms
Before we begin to study the properties induced by social choice axioms, we look at the properties
that fixed point rules have without any further assumptions. To this end, we will define two
properties of a community rule C.
Property 1 (Independence of Outside Opinions (IOO)). A community funcion C satisfies Inde-
pendence of Outside Opinions if, for all subsets S ⊆ V and all pairs of preference profiles Π,Π′
on V such that pi′s = pis for all s ∈ S, we have that
S ∈ C(V,Π′)⇐⇒ S ∈ C(V,Π).
Property IOO simply states that the preferences of outsiders cannot influence whether or
not a subset is a community. It turns out that this property (and one of our Axioms) is always
satisfied by any fixed-point community rule.
Proposition 2. All fixed-point rules satisfy Independence of Outside Opinions and World Com-
munity.
4While we use the embedding axiom to makes statements about subsets of a given ground set V , see, e.g.,
Propositions 5 and 7 below, we never use that we can embed a given preference network into an even larger one.
Therefore, all results of this paper, except for those involving complexity statements, hold if one restricts oneself
to a finite set V0, and only considers preference networks defined on subsets V ⊂ V0.
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Proof. Clearly, any fixed point rule satisfies IOO since the preferences of outsiders are entirely
ignored when deciding if a subset constitutes a fixed point. The axiom WC is satisfied vacuously,
because it involves looking at all v ∈ V − V .
Turning now to social choice axioms, we must first formally define the axioms informally
described in Section 1.2. To this end, we need the notion of an election, which will be defined
as a triple (V, F, S) where V and S are finite sets (called the set of candidates and voters,
respectively), and F : L(V )∗ → L(V ) is a preference aggregation function.
Social Choice Axiom 1 (Unanimity (U)). An election (V, F, S) satisfies Unanimity if, for all
preference profiles, ΠS = {pis : s ∈ S} ∈ L(V )
S and all pairs of candidates, {i, j} ⊆ V ,
pis(i) > pis(j),∀s ∈ S =⇒ F (ΠS)(i) > F (ΠS)(j).
The question then is: what properties capture the intuition behind Unanimity and how do
they relate to this social choice axiom? To answer this, we define the following two properties
of a community function C.
Property 2 (Pareto Efficiency (PE)). A community function, C, is Pareto Efficient if, for a given
preference network A and a given community S ∈ C(A), it is the case that for all u ∈ S, v /∈ S,
there is a s ∈ S such that u ≻πs v.
Property 3 (Clique (Cq)). A community function C satisfies the Clique Property if for all
A = (V,Π),
u ≻πs v,∀u, s ∈ S,∀v /∈ S =⇒ S ∈ C(A).
Property Pareto Efficiency is a negative property that states that subsets in which a non-
member is preferred to a member by everyone inside the subset, should not be a community. In
contrast, Clique is a positive Property, in that it states that a completely self-loving group (i.e.,
a clique) must be a community.
It turns out that both of these properties are implied by Unanimity.
Proposition 3. Fix V and a preference aggregation function F , and let CF be the fixed point
rule with respect to F . If all elections (V, F, S) with S ( V satisfies Unanimity, then CF satisfies
the properties Pareto Efficiency and Clique.
Proof. Fix a preference network A = (V,Π).
First, let us show that CF satisfies Pareto Efficiency. Assume otherwise. In this case there
must be a community S ( V such that for some s ∈ S and j /∈ S, everyone in S prefers j to
s. However, this implies that j must be ranked higher than s in F (ΠS) by Unanimity. By the
pigeon hole principle this implies that the elements of S cannot occupy the first |S| positions of
this preference aggregation, and therefore S is not a community.
Now to show that CF satisfies the Clique Property, assume S ( V is a clique (∀i, j ∈ S and
k /∈ S, j ≻πi k). Then all elements of S are preferred by all members of S to all members of
V −S and therefore must appear in the first |S| slots of F (ΠS) by Unanimity. This then implies
that S is a community as required.
Social Choice Axiom 2 (Non-Dictatorship (ND)). An election (V, S, F ) is Non-Dictatorial if
there exists no dictator, i.e., no voter i ∈ S such that F (ΠS) = pii for all preference profiles
ΠS ∈ L(V )
S.
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Instead of showing properties implied by ND as we did with Unanimity, we do the inverse,
and show that a dictatorship violates some of our axioms.
Proposition 4. Fix V and a preference aggregation function F . If CF , the fixed point rule with
respect to F , satisfies Group Stability or Anonymity, then all elections (V, F, S) with S ⊂ V and
1 < |S| < |V | satisfy Non-Dictatorship.
Proof. Assume (V, F, S) is dictatorial, with dictator s ∈ S. Let pis be such that all members of
S are ranked above those outside of S. Because s is a dictator, we have that S is a community
(S ∈ CF ). Additionally let every other member of S rank some non-member v /∈ S above s.
However, if CF satisfies Group Stability, S cannot be a community. Furthermore, if CF
satisfies Anonymity, if the preferences of any two members of S are swapped, S should remain a
community. However, if s swaps with any other member of S, v will be ranked above s in the
aggregate preference and thus S cannot be a community.
The last of the three social choice axioms, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, simply
states that the aggregate relation between any two pairs of candidates should not depend on the
preferences for any other candidate.
Social Choice Axiom 3. (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) An election (V, F, S) satisfies
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) if for all preference profiles, ΠS ,Π
′
S ∈ L(V )
S and
all candidates a, b ∈ V we have that(
∀s ∈ S, a ≻πs b⇔ a ≻π′s b
)
=⇒
(
a ≻F (ΠS) b⇔ a ≻F (Π′S) b
)
.
This axiom is can reasonably be considered the strongest of the three, in that it says that
the aggregate preference between two candidates does not even depend on the preferences voters
have between either of the two and some other candidate. We will demonstrate this strength by
proving an impossibility result involving modest assumptions about the fixed point rule of an
aggregation function that satisfies IIA.
Theorem 1. Let F be an aggregation function such that the fixed point rule with respect to
F satisfies the Clique Property and the Group Stability Axiom. Then no election (V, F, S) with
S ⊆ V and 1 < |S| < |V | satisfies IIA.
Proof. Let S ⊆ V such that 1 < |S| < |V |. Assume that the election (V, F, S) satisfies IIA,
and the resulting fixed point rule CF satisfies Cq and GS. We will first show that the election
(V, F, S) must satisfy Unanimity.
In the following preference profiles, Π, Π′, Π′′ ∈ L(V )S , we assume that every member of S
has the same preference, pi, pi′, and pi′′ respectively. First, let pi rank all members of S above
non-members. By the Clique Property, S ∈ CF (A) and thus
∀s ∈ S, v /∈ S, s ≻F (Π) v. (1)
Thus, by IIA, if s ∈ S is unanimously preferred to v /∈ S, s must be strictly preferred to v in the
aggregate preference.
Now let pi′ be the same as pi only with the least preferred member of S, s′, and the most
preferred non-member, v′, switched in rank. By the partial Unanimity property (1), in the
12
aggregate F (Π′), all members of S − {s′} are preferred to all v /∈ S, and all members of S are
preferred to all v ∈ V − S −{s′}. On the other hand, by GS, S /∈ CF (Π
′), which is only possible
is if v′ F (Π′) s
′. Applying the partial Unanimity property once more yields the following two
statements:
∀s ∈ S − {s′}, s ≻F (Π′) s
′ and ∀v /∈ S ∪ {v′}, v′ ≻F (Π′) v,
and by IIA, this in turn implies
∀s ∈ S − {s′}, s ≻F (Π) s
′ and ∀v /∈ S ∪ {v′}, v′ ≻F (Π) v. (2)
By IIA, this means that for any two members or two non-members if one is unanimously preferred
to the other, then it must be strictly preferred in aggregate preference. Indeed, consider, e.g.,
s, s′ ∈ S and a profile Π˜S such that s ≻π˜i s
′ for all i ∈ S. Choose Π in such a way that every
member has the same profile, s′ has rank |S| and s ≻πi s
′ for all i ∈ S. By IIA, s ≻F (Π˜) s
′ ⇐⇒
s ≻F (Π) s
′, so by (2), s is preferred to s′ in aggregate.
Finally, consider pi′′ where v′ is switched with the second lowest ranked member, s′′. By the
above additional partial Unanimity property, s′ must be strictly preferred to s′′ in the aggregate
preference F (Π′′), and therefore v′ must be strictly rather than weakly preferred to s′′ in the
aggregate preference. Thus, again by IIA, if a non-member, v /∈ S, is unanimously preferred to
a member s ∈ S, v must be strictly preferred to s in the aggregate preference. Taken together,
these three partial Unanimity properties, constitute Unanimity.
Since the election (V, F, S) satisfies both IIA and Unanimity, by Arrow’s Impossibility Theo-
rem [2] it must be a dictatorship, contradicting Proposition 4.
2.4 Additional Properties of Axioms
Here we state some additional properties of interest that community rules (not necessarily fixed
point rules) have when they satisfy one or more of our main axioms.
Proposition 5. Let C be a community rule that satisfies the World Community and Embedding
Axioms. Then C must also satisfy the Cliques Property.
Proof. Let A = (V,Π) be a preference network and S be a clique (every member of S prefers
S to V − S). By World Community, we have that S ∈ C((S,Π|S)) and by Embedding we have
C(A) ∩ 2S = C((S,Π|S)). Therefore S is a community.
Proposition 6. Any community rule C that satisfies Monotonicity must satisfy Independence of
Outside Opinions.
Proof. Let A = (V,Π) be a preference network. Axiom Mon features an alternative preference
profile Π′ stating that if Π′ satisfies certain properties and S is a community for (V,Π′), then
S must be a community (V,Π). Because the axiom places no restrictions on the preferences of
voters from V − S, the rule C must satisfy IOO.
Property 4 (Outsider Departure (OD)). A community rule C satisfies the Outsider Departure
Property if for a given preference network A = (V,Π), community S ∈ C(A), and outsider v /∈ S,
we have that S ∈ C(V − {v},Π|V −{s}).
13
Proposition 7. A community rule, C, that satisfies the Monotonicity and Embedding Axioms
must also satisfy the Outsider Departure Property.
Proof. Let A = (V,Π) be a preference network, S ∈ C(A) a community, and v /∈ S an outsider.
Consider the preference profile Π′ that ranks v at the end of everyones preference. By Mon,
S ∈ C(V,Π′). Furthermore, since Π′ satisfies the setup for Embedding, we also have S ∈ C(V −
{v},Π′|V−{v}). However, Π
′|V−{v} = Π|V−{v} since Π and Π
′ only differ in the placement of v.
Therefore we have S ∈ C(V − {v},Π|V −{s}).
Proposition 8. If a community rule satisfies the Group Stability and Self-Approval Axioms it
must satisfy the Pareto Efficiency Property.
Proof. Let S be a community.
Case 1: |S| = 1. By Self-Approval, the one member s must rank herself above all outsiders
and therefore satisfies PE.
Case 2: |S| > 1. Choose G ⊂ S such that G is a singleton {s′}. By Group Stability, for all
outsider singletons {g′} ⊆ V − S and bijections (fi : {s′} → {g′}, i ∈ S − G) there exists an
s ∈ S − G such that s′ ≻πs fs(s
′). Since it is clear that fs(s
′) = g′, s provides the necessary
witness for s′ and S satisfies PE.
3 Aggregation Based Communities Rules
We now examine several examples of aggregation based community rules through the lens of
our axiomatic framework. In Section 3.1, we focus on a what we call weighted fixed-point
rules, starting with the B3CT community function from [3]. We show that it violates both
Axioms Monotonicity and Group Stability. The violation of the monotonicity axiom was initially
somewhat of a surprise and rather counterintuitive to us. This violation is illustrative of the
subtlety of community rules; indeed, it helped us to identify a weaker monotonicity property
that the B3CT function satisfies. We then show that the fixed-point community rule based on
any Borda-count-like voting function is inconsistent with either the Group Stability axiom or
the Clique property. This impossibility result and Theorem 1 illustrate some basic limitations
of fixed-point community rules. Next, we study the properties of the harmonious community
function in Section 3.2. We will show that it can be obtained by preference aggregation, and
that it obeys all of our axioms except for Axiom GS. It does, however, satisfy a weaker version
of this axiom, see Theorem 4. In our final subsection, Section 3.3, we compare the three rules
Borda voting, B3CT voting, and the harmonious rule.
3.1 Weighted Fixed Point Rules
This section focuses on a class of community rules that lie in between general fixed point rules
and the B3CT community rule, which we call weighted fixed point rules. First, we will look at
some of the properties of the B3CT rule as a particular case of a weighted fixed point rule.
Theorem 2. The B3CT community rule, CB3CT , does not satisfy Monotonicity or Group Stabil-
ity. It satisfies all other axioms, as well as Properties Pareto Efficiency and Clique.
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Proof. Directly from the definition of the B3CT voting function φΠS , CB3CT satisfies Axioms A,
WC, Emb, and Properties PE and Cq. Suppose CB3CT does not satisfy SA. Then, there exists a
preference network A = (V,Π), S ∈ CB3CT (A), T ⊆ V −S, and a tuple of bijections (fs : S → T )
such that for all s, u ∈ S, u ≺πs fs(u). It follows that ∀s ∈ S, the numbers of votes cast by s
for S according to φΠS is less than the numbers of votes that s casts for T . Summing up the
votes from S, the average votes that members of T receive is larger than the average votes that
members of S receive, contradicting the assumption that everyone in S receives more votes than
everyone in T . Thus, CB3CT satisfies SA.
To show CB3CT satisfies Axiom CRM, consider S, Π and Π
′ as in Axiom CRM. By the
coherence assumption for members, there exists σ ∈ L(S) such that for s1, s2 ∈ S, for all s ∈ S,
s1 ≻π′s s2 if and only if s1 ≻σ s2.
Let s∗ denote the least preferred elements of S according to σ. By the assumption that
pis(v) = pi
′
s(v) for all s ∈ S, v ∈ V − S, we have that pis(V − S) = pi
′
S(V − S), and hence also
that pis(S) = pi
′
s(S). But this implies that for all u ∈ S
φΠS (u) =
∑
s∈S
1πs(u)≤|S| ≥
∑
s∈S
1πs(S)⊆[1:S] =
∑
s∈S
1π′s(S)⊆[1:S] =
∑
s∈S
1π′s(s∗)≤|S| = φ
Π′
S (s
∗).
If S ∈ CB3CT (V,Π
′)), then s∗ receives more votes from Π′S than every v ∈ V −S, and the number
of votes v receives from ΠS is the same as the number of votes it receives from Π
′
S . On the other
hand, for all u ∈ S, the number of votes u receives from ΠS is at least the number of votes s
∗
receives from Π′S , implying that S ∈ CB3CT (V,Π). We can similarly show that CB3CT satisfies
Axiom CRNM.
Let V = [1 : 6], S = [1 : 3], let Π = (pi1, ..., pi6) be the preference profile
pi1 = [142356], pi2 = [253416], pi3 = [631425]
pi4 = [456123], pi5 = [156423], pi6 = [165423]
and let Π′ be the preference profile
pi′1 = [142356], pi
′
2 = [234516], pi
′
3 = [314625]
pi′4 = pi4, pi
′
5 = pi5, pi
′
6 = pi6.
Then S = [1 : 3] ∈ CB3CT (V,Π), as each members of S receives two votes while everyone in [4 : 6]
receives only one vote. However, in violation of Axiom Mon, S is no longer a B3CT community
w.r.t Π′, since 4 now receives three votes, one more than 1, 2 and 3.
Note also T = (1, 5, 6) ∈ CB3CT (V,Π). Let G = {5, 6} ⊂ T and G
′ = (2, 4) ⊂ V − T . As
member 1 prefers 2 to 5 and 4 to 6, T does not satisfy Group Stability.
Note that the same analysis shows that CB3CT does not satisfy the Outsider Departure Prop-
erty. In the example above, if member 5 leaves the system, then member 4 will receive 2 votes
from S = {1, 2, 3}, and hence S is no longer a CB3CT -community.
Even though CB3CT does not satisfy Mon, it does enjoy the following monotonicity property.
Property 5 (Outsider Respecting Monotonicity). If S is a community of a preference network
A = (V,Π), then S remains a community of (V,Π′) for any Π′ such that (1) u ≻πs t ⇒ u ≻π′s t,
∀u, s ∈ S, t ∈ V , and (2) v ≻πs v
′ ⇒ v ≻π′s v
′, ∀v, v′ ∈ V − S, s ∈ S.
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We now analyze the fixed point rule defined by the family of aggregation functions, such as
Borda count and B3CT voting, that derive a cardinal social preference from ordinal individual
preferences.
LetW be a sequence of weight vectors wi ∈ Rn, W = (w1, w2, . . . ), where n is the number of
elements in V . For a non-empty finite S ⊂ N and ΠS ∈ L(V )S define the aggregate preference
FW (ΠS) on V by
i ≻F (Πs) j ⇐⇒
∑
s∈S
w
|S|
πs(i)
>
∑
s∈S
w
|S|
πs(j)
.
In other words, i ≻ j in the aggregate iff the total weight of the votes i receives from S is larger
than the total weight of the votes j receives from S, where a vote in position p gets weight w
|S|
p .
In B3CT, wk is the vector of k ones followed by (n − k) zeros5, while Borda count uses
wk = (n, n− 1, ..., 1) for all k.
Definition 8 (Weighted Fixed Point Rule). For a sequence of vectors W = (w1, w2, . . . ) in Rn,
CW is the fixed point rule with respect to FW .
Proposition 9. Weighted fixed-point rules satisfy Axiom Anonymity. They satisfy Outsider
Respecting Monotonicity if wki ≥ w
k
j for all k ∈ [1 : n− 1] and i ≤ j, and they satisfy the Clique
Property if and only if for all k ∈ [1 : n− 1] the weight vector wk is such that wki > w
k
j for i ≤ k
and j > k.
Proof. The proof of the first two statements and the “if” part of the third follow directly from
the definitions. To see the “only if” part of the third statement, consider k, i, j such that
wki ≤ w
k
j , and let S,Π ∈ L(V ) be such that |S| = k, pis ≤ k for all s, u ∈ S, and pis(v) = pit(v)
for all s, t ∈ S, v ∈ V . Then S satisfies the condition of the Property Cq, but it is not a
community. To see this, choose v ∈ S and v′ /∈ S such that pis(v) = i and pis(v
′) = j. Then∑
s∈S w
k
πs(v)
≤
∑
s∈S w
k
πs(v′)
, showing that S is not a community.
Together with Proposition 5, the next theorem implies that there is no weighted fixed point
rule that satisfies the Group Stability, World Community and Embedding Axioms.
Theorem 3. (Impossibility of Weighted Aggregation Schema) Weighted Fixed Point
Rules are inconsistent with either the Group Stability Axiom or the Clique Property.
Proof. Let A = (V,Π) be a preference network, S ⊂ V , and CW a weighted fixed point rule
satisfying the the Clique Property. Throughout the the proof, we will take
V = {a, b, c, d, e} and S = {a, b, c},
and consider preference profiles such that S violates Group Stability. In order for CW to obey
the Axiom GS, we would need the weight vector w3 ∈ R5 to be such that S /∈ C(V,Π) for all
Π considered in this proof. Our goal is to show that this will lead to a contradiction. We start
under the assumption that the weights are decreasing, i.e., in addition to the already established
5The rule C
B
3
CT
does not specify what the weight wk should be for k > n since preferences with more voters
than alternatives do not occur when determining communities – so we are free to define it arbitrarily, say wki = 1
for all i if k > n.
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fact that w3i > w
3
j when i = 1, 2, 3 and j = 4, 5 (since CW satisfies the the Clique Property), we
will first assume that w31 ≥ w
3
2 ≥ w
3
3 and w
3
4 ≥ w
3
5.
Consider the following scenario:
pia = [adebc], pib = pic = [abcde].
Since a prefers d and e over b and c, S is not group stable and hence cannot be a community. By
our assumption that w31 ≥ w
3
2 ≥ w
3
2 > w
3
4 ≥ w
3
4, we have that a ≻FW (ΠS) b FW (Πs) c ≻FW (ΠS) e
and b ≻FW (ΠS) d. Therefore the only way S cannot be a community is that d FW (ΠS) c, i.e.,
w32 + 2w
3
4 ≥ 2w
3
3 + w5.
Notice that this implies that we cannot have both w32 = w
3
3 and w
3
4 = w
3
5.
Now consider a modified preference profile:
pi′a = pi
′
b = [abdce], pi
′
c = [caebd].
In this profile a and b prefer d over c, so again S violates GS and hence cannot be a community.
On the other hand, we now have a ≻FW (Π′S) b, b FW (Π′S) d ≻FW (Π′S) e. Thus we must have
either b ∼FW (Π′) d or d FW (Π′S) c. The former, however, implies w
3
2 = w
3
3 and w
3
4 = w
3
5 and is
hence a contradiction. Therefore the latter must be true which implies
2w33 + w
3
5 ≥ w
3
1 + 2w
3
4.
This brings us to the final preference profile:
pi′′a = [abdce], pi
′′
b = [dcabe], pi
′′
c = [cbaed].
Again a and b prefer d to c, so the profile violates GS, and hence again can’t be a community.
Now a ≻FW (Π′′) c FW (Π′′) b and d ≻FW (Π′′) e, showing that for S not to be a community, we
must have d FW (Π′′) b, which gives
w31 + w
3
3 + w
3
5 ≥ 2w
3
2 + w
3
4.
Defining di = w
3
i − w
3
i−1, we can write the bounds obtained so far as
d4 ≤ d3 + d5
d2 + d3 + d5 ≤ d4
d3 + d4 + d5 ≤ d2.
Chaining up these three bounds, we get
d3 + d5 ≥ d4 ≥ d2 + d3 + d5 ≥ d3 + d4 + d5 + d3 + d5 = 2(d3 + d5) + d4,
contradicting our assumption di ≥ 0 and the fact that Cq implies d4 > 0.
To relax the constraint that the weights are ordered, we observe that all three profiles
considered in the proof are such that, under arbitrary permutations of the first three and the
last two positions, S still violates GS. In other words, for any permutation σ of [1 : 5] that
leaves [1 : 3] and [4 : 5] invariant, S violates GS under the profiles {σ ◦ pis}s∈S , {σ
′ ◦ pis}s∈S , and
{σ′′ ◦ pis}s∈S . Choosing the permutation in such a way that the weights w˜
3
i = w
3
σ(i) are ordered,
we obtain the above three inequalities for the weights w˜3i , leading again to a contradiction.
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3.2 Properties of Harmonious Communities
In this subsection, we analyze the harmonious community function given by Definition 5. We
first prove that it can be expressed in terms of a suitable preference aggregation function.
Proposition 10. There exists a preference aggregation function FH : L(V )
∗ → L(V ) such that
the harmonious community function H is defined by a FH.
Proof. Given V , a finite set S, and a preference profile ΠS ∈ L(V )
S , we consider the following
directed graph GΠS = (V,EΠS ) where (i, j) ∈ EΠS if at least half of S prefers i to j. Note that
if |S| is an odd number, then GΠS is a tournament graph. If |S| is an even number, then EΠS
contains both (i, j) and (j, i) if exactly half of ΠS prefer i to j. GΠS is total since for all i, j ∈ V ,
either (i, j) ∈ EΠS or (j, i) ∈ EΠS . Because GΠS is total, the graph GˆΠs obtained from GΠS by
contracting each strongly connected component into a single vertex is an acyclic, tournament
graph. As a consequence, the graph GˆΠs has exactly one Hamiltonian path that totally orders
its vertices. Let (V1, ..., Vt) be the strongly connected components of GΠS , sorted by the order
determined by the Hamiltonian path. The partition (V1, ..., Vt) of V then defines an ordered
partition FH(ΠS), with Vi ≻FH(ΠS) Vj iff i ≤ j.
Next, we consider a subset T ⊂ V . It is then easy to check that if T is of the form T = ∪j≤iVj
for some i ∈ [1 : t], then for all u ∈ T, v ∈ V − T , a majority of S prefers u to v, and vice versa.
Specializing to S = T , we see that H is defined by the preference aggregation function FH.
Next we show that H satisfies all axioms except for Group Stability.
Theorem 4. The harmonious community function satisfies Axioms A, SA, Mon, Emb, WC,
CRM, and CRNM, but it does not satisfy GS.
Proof. Directly from the definitions, one easily checks that H satisfies Axioms A, Mon, Emb and
WC.
By a similar argument to the proof of Theorem 2, we can prove that H satisfies SA: if
S ∈ H(A) does not satisfy SA, then there exists a T ⊂ V − S of the same size as S such that
each s ∈ S lexicographically prefers T over S. With the help of Proposition 1, this implies that,
for each s ∈ S, there are at least (1 + 2 + · · · + |S|) pairs (u, v) ∈ S × T such that s prefers v
over u. Thus the number of triples (s, u, v) such that s ∈ S prefers v ∈ T over u ∈ S is at least
|S|2(|S| + 1)/2. However, S ∈ H(A) implies that this number has to be strictly smaller than
|S|3/2.
To see that H is consistent with Axiom CRNM, consider a preference profile Π,Π′ as specified
in Axiom CRNM. By the coherence assumption on non-members, there exists a linear order σ
on V − S, such that ∀i, j ∈ V − S and ∀s ∈ S, i ≻π′s j ⇔ i ≻σ j. Let v
∗ be the most preferred
element of σ. By the assumption that pis(u) = pi
′
s(u) for all s, u ∈ S, we have pis(S) = pi
′
s(S)
and hence also pis(V − S) = pi
′
s(V − S). But this implies that for all v ∈ V − S,
pis(v) ≥ min{i ∈ pis(V − S)} = min{i ∈ pi
′
s(V − S)} = pi
′
s(v
∗).
We therefore have shown that for all s, u ∈ S such that u ≻π′s v
∗, we have that u ≻πs v for all
v ∈ V −S. Assume now that S ∈ H((V,Π′)). Then for all u ∈ S, the majority of (Π′, S) prefer
u to v∗, which, as we just have shown, implies that for all v ∈ V − S, the majority of (Π, S)
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prefer u to v, which in turn implies that S ∈ H((V,Π)). We can similarly show that H satisfies
Axiom CRM.
The set T in the proof of Theorem 2 is also an example that H violates Axiom GS.
While H does not satisfy the GS Axiom, it satisfies the following weaker property.
Property 6. Weak Group Stability For all preference profiles Π on V and all S ∈ C(V,Π), S is
weakly group stable. Here a set S ⊂ V is called weakly group stable if for all G ⊂ S, G′ ⊂ V −S
s.t. 0 < |G| = |G′| ≤ |S|/2, and all bijections (f : G → G′, i ∈ S −G) there exists s ∈ S −G,
u ∈ G such that u ≻πs f(u).
Note that the property is weaker than the GS Axiom in two ways: we restrict ourselves to
groups G of size at most |S|/2, and we only allow for a global bijection f , rather than individual
bijections fs.
Proposition 11. H is weakly group stable, while the Borda count and the B3CT rule are not.
Proof. Consider a set S ∈ H(V,Π), subsets G ⊂ S and G′ ⊂ V − S such that 0 < |G| = |G′| ≤
|S|/2, and a bijection f : G→ G′. For each u ∈ G the majority of S prefer u to f(u) (who is not
a member of S), and since |G| ≤ |S|/2, this implies that there must be at least one s ∈ S − G
such that s prefers u to f(u), as required.
To give a counterexample for both Borda counting and the B3CT rule, consider V = [1 : 6],
G = [3 : 4] and G′ = [5 : 6], with preference profiles
pi1 = [125463], pi2 = [126354], pi3 = [341256], pi4 = [341256].
Then 1 and 2 prefer 5 over 4, and 6 over 3, but S is a community both with respect to B3CT
(where 1 and 2 get four votes, 3 and 4 get three votes, and 5 and 6 get only one vote), and with
respect to Borda count (with counts 20, 16, 18, 16, 10, 8 for 1, . . . , 6, respectively).
Proposition 12. H satisfies IOO as well as Cq and the PE, but FH does not satisfy U.
Proof. By Proposition 2, H satisfies IOO. To see that it does not satisfy U, let V = {a, b, c},
let S = {a, b} and pia = (acb), pib = (bac). Then a ≻πs c for all s ∈ S, and both a ≻πs b and
b ≻πs c in half of S. Therefore (ac), (cb), (bc), (ab), (ba) ∈ EΠS . Thus, a, b, c belongs to the
same connected component in GΠS , showing that S is not a harmonious community. To see
that H satisfies both Cq and PE in spite of the fact that it does not satisfy the assumptions of
Proposition 3, we use Proposition 5 to infer Cq, and the observation that S ∈ H(A) implies that
for any a pair of elements (u ∈ S, v 6∈ S), the majority of S prefer u over v, proving PE.
3.3 Comparison of Borda voting, B3CT voting, and the harmonious rule
In this subsection, we compare the fixed-point community rules that we have discussed so far:
Borda voting, B3CT voting, and the harmonious rule. While all three have their own appealing
simplicity and intuition and all satisfy Axioms A, SA, Emb, WC, CRM, and CRNM, there are
significant differences with respect to Axioms Mon and GS, and the Outsider Departure property.
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• Outsider Departure: A harmonious community S remains a harmonious community when
any outsider v 6∈ S leaves the system since the departure does not alter any pairwise
preferences. However, for a B3CT community S, the departure of an outsider can increase
the votes for other outsiders enough to destabilize the B3CT community. In a similar way,
one can see that the Borda count rule is also unstable to departure of an outsider.
• Monotonicity: The harmonious rule satisfies Axiom Mon. The other two only satisfy the
weaker Outsider Respecting Monotonicity property6.
• Group Stability: The subset T in the proof of Theorem 2 is a community according to all
these three community rules. But T violates GS because 1 prefers outsiders over 5 and 6,
even though 5 and 6 prefer 1 over everyone else: Element 1 is an “arrogant” member of its
community. All aggregation functions satisfying Unanimity seem to be prone to existence
of “arrogant” members. The harmonious rule satisfies the stability of majority subgroup
under a global bijection f , although the stability of the minority subgroup (or the majority
subgroup with individual bijections fs) may not be guaranteed. The fixed-point rule of
Borda count and B3CT voting essentially have no guarantee of group stability.
• Small World: In general, we say a community function C satisfies the Small World property
if
S ∈ C((V,Π))⇔ ∀U ⊆ V − S, |U | < |S|, S ∈ C(S ∪ U,Π|S∪U ).
This Helly-type property [5] localizes the identification of a community. Note that the
Small World property includes some form of Outsider Departure together with the property
that every community is “locally” verifiable. One can easily show that the fixed-point
rules of the Borda count or B3CT voting do not have the Small World property, while the
harmonious rule enjoys the following stronger variant of the small world property
S ∈ H((V,Π))⇔ ∀v ∈ V − S, S ∈ H(S ∪ {v},Π|S∪{v}),
and hence the property given in (3).
4 Taxonomy of Community Rules
In this section, we characterize the taxonomy of the axiom-conforming community rules.
First, in Section 4.1, we define two rules, the Clique Rule and the Comprehensive Rule,
which satisfy all axioms, and which are most selective and most comprehensive, respectively, in
the sense that any rule which satisfies all axioms leads to a set of communities which contains
all communities defined by the Clique Rule and is contained in the Comprehensive Rule (the
statement that this is the case, Theorem 5, will be our main theorem in this subsection).
In the next subsection, Section 4.2, we then expand on this “Taxonomy Theorem”, and show
that under the following natural intersection and union of community rules, the family of all
community rules that satisfies all eight axioms forms a bounded lattice. We will use the following
two set-theoretic operators of community functions to define these lattice structures.
6Again, we can use the profiles from the proof of Theorem 2 to show that the Borda count rule does not satisfy
Mon.
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Definition 9 (Operations over Community Rules). For two community functions C1 and C2,
we define the intersection and union, C1 ∩ C2 and C1 ∪ C2, as the community functions which,
for all preference networks A, respectively satisfy
(C1 ∩ C2)(A) := C1(A) ∩ C2(A)
(C1 ∪ C2)(A) := C1(A) ∪ C2(A).
4.1 From the Most Selective to Most Comprehensive Rule
We start with perhaps the simplest rule for communities that satisfies the Clique Property.
Rule 1 (Clique Rule (Cclique)). A non-empty subset S ⊆ V is a community of A = (V,Π), if
and only if ∀u, s ∈ S, v /∈ S, u ≻πs v. We use Cclique to denote the community function defined
by this rule.
Proposition 13. Cclique satisfies all Axioms.
Proof. The (easy) proof is left as an exercise for the reader.
However, the clique rule appears to be too restrictive, since it has the following structural
feature, which essentially rules out any non-trivial overlap of communities, while “Real-world”
communities typically have non-trivial overlaps among themselves.
Proposition 14. For any preference network A, if S1, S2 ∈ Cclique(A), then either S1 ∩ S2 = ∅
or S1 ⊂ S2, or S2 ⊂ S1.
Proof. Assume otherwise. By assumption, we can choose an element s ∈ S1∩S2. Without loss of
generality assume |S1| ≤ |S2|. Again by assumption, there exists an element s
′ ∈ S1 and s
′ /∈ S2.
By the definition of the Cclique s must have s
′ in its top |S1| choices. However, this means that
s′ is also in the top |S2| choices for s, which violates the fact that S2 is in Cclique(A).
Next we address the question of whether there are rules consistent with all axioms that admit
overlapping communities. To address this question, we consider rules defined by community
axioms.
Rule 2 (Axiom Based Community Rules). For X ∈ {GS, SA} let CX be the community rule
defined by A = (V,Π) 7→ CX(A), where CX(A) is the set of non-empty subsets S ⊂ V such that
S obeys axiom X.
For example, CGS denote the community rule that S ∈ CGS(A) if and only S enjoys the
Group Stability Axiom.
The first part of our Taxonomy Theorem is a direct consequence of the following basic lemma.
Lemma 1. (Intersection Lemma: GS and SA) For X ∈ {A, Mon, CRM, CRNM, WC, Emb},
if C satisfies Axiom X, then C˜ = C ∩ CGS ∩ CSA satisfies Axioms X, GA and SA.
Proof. CGS and CSA are both consistent with A, WC, and Emb, thus if C satisfies Axiom X ∈
{A, WC, Emb}, then C˜ remains consistent with Axiom X.
To see C˜ satisfies Axiom Mon if C satisfies Mon, choose Π,Π′ such that, for all u, s ∈ S and
v ∈ V , u ≻π′s v =⇒ u ≻πs v. We need to show that if S ∈ C˜((V,Π
′)) then S ∈ C˜((V,Π)).
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Suppose this is not the case, then either (1) S 6∈ CGS((V,Π)) or (2) S 6∈ CSA((V,Π)). In Case
(1), there exists G ⊂ S, G′ ⊂ V −S, |G| = |G′|, and bijections (fs : S → G
′|s ∈ S−G) such that
∀s ∈ S − G,∀u ∈ G, u ≺πs fs(u). Then by the condition stated in Mon, we have u ≺π′s fs(u),
which shows S 6∈ CGS(A
′). In Case (2), there exists G′ ⊂ V − S, bijections (fs : S → G
′) such
that ∀s, u ∈ S, u ≺πs fs(u). Then by the condition stated in Mon, we have u ≺π′s fs(u), which
implies that S 6∈ CGS(A
′).
Suppose C satisfies Axiom CRM. Consider Π,Π′ as specified in Axiom CRM. Given s ∈ S,
the profiles pis and pi
′
s are then assumed to be identical on V − S, implying in particular that
pis(V − S) = pi
′(V − S), and hence also that pis(S) = pi
′
s(S). Furthermore, by the coherence
assumption for members, there exist σ ∈ L(S) such that ∀u1, u2, s ∈ S, u1 ≻π′s u2 iff u1 ≻σ u2.
We need to show that if S ∈ C˜((V,Π′)) then S ∈ C˜(A). Suppose this is not the case, then either
(1) S 6∈ CGS(A) or (2) S 6∈ CSA(A).
In Case (1), there exists G ⊂ S, G′ ⊂ V − S, |G| = |G′|, a set of bijections (fs : G →
G′, s ∈ S − G), such that ∀s ∈ S − G,u ∈ G, u ≺πs fs(u). Let T ⊂ S be the set of |G| least
preferred elements by σ. We now show that there exists bijections (f ′s : T → G
′, s ∈ S) such
that ∀s ∈ S − T, u ∈ T , u ≺π′s f
′
s(u), which would imply that S 6∈ CGS((V,Π
′)).
Let us denote T by T = {t1, ..., t|T |} such that ti ≺σ ti+1. Fix an s ∈ S − T , and let us
denote G by G = {g1, ..., g|T |} such that gi ≺πs gi+1, and denote G
′ by G′ = {g′1, ..., g
′
|T |} such
that g′i ≺πs g
′
i+1. By Proposition 1, we then have that gi ≺πs g
′
i for all i = 1, . . . , |T |. In
other words, pis(gi) > pis(g
′
i). We define f
′
s by mapping ti to g
′
i. Note that the positions of
the preferences rankings of S as a set are the same in pi′s and pis. Because T is the set of |G|
least preferred elements of S, we have pi′s(ti) > pis(gi). Since pi
′
s(g
′
i) = pis(g
′
i) it then follows that
pi′s(ti) > pis(gi) > pis(g
′
i) = pis(g
′
i). Thus, ti ≺π′s g
′
i, and consequently, S 6∈ CGS((V,Π
′)). In Case
(2), there exists G′ ⊂ V − S and a set of bijections (fs : S → G
′, s ∈ S), such that ∀s, u ∈ S,
u ≺πs fs(u). By the similar argument as in Case (1) (by setting T = S), we can show that there
exists bijections (f ′s : S → G
′, s ∈ S) such that ∀s ∈ S, u ∈ S, u ≺π′s f
′
s(u), which implies that
S 6∈ CGS((V,Π
′)). Thus, C˜ satisfies Axiom CRM.
We can similarly prove that C satisfies CRNM if C satisfies it.
Finally, by definition, C ∩ CGS ∩ CSA satisfies GS and SA.
Rule 3. (Comprehensive Community Rule) For a preference network A = (V,Π), a non-
empty S ⊆ V is a community according to Ccomprehensive if and only if S satisfies both Group
Stability and Self-Approval axioms. In other words,
Ccomprehensive := CGS ∩ CSA.
We now prove that Ccomprehensive is indeed the most comprehesive community rule that
satisfies all Axioms.
Theorem 5 (Taxonomy: Lattice Top and Bottom). Ccomprehensive satisfies all Axioms. More-
over, for any community function C that satisfies all Axioms, for every preference network
A = (V,Π)
Cclique(A) ⊆ C(A) ⊆ Ccomprehensive(A). (3)
Proof. Call(A) = 2
V−{∅} satisfies Axioms A,Mon, CRM, CRNM,WC and Emb. Since Ccomprehensive =
Call ∩ CGS ∩ CSA, by the Intersection Lemma, Ccomprehensive satisfies all Axioms.
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On the other hand, by Proposition 5, any rule which satisfies WC and Emb, must satisfy the
Cliques Property, so for any C that satisfies all axioms, Cclique(A) ⊆C(A) ⊆ CGS(A) ∩ CSA(A).
Thus Cclique(A) ⊆ C(A) ⊆ Ccomprehensive(A).
Theorem 5 shows that Ccomprehensive and Cclique are the most inclusive and the most selective
function, respectively, that satisfies all axioms. While it is very easy to determine whether
a subset in a preference network satisfies Property Clique, in Section 5 we demonstrate that
Ccomprehensive is highly “non-constructive” by showing that the decision problem for determining
whether a subset in a preference network satisfies Axiom Self-Approval or Group Stability is coNP-
complete.
4.2 The Lattice Structure of Community Rules
The Intersection Lemma provides us with a tool for exploring the taxonomy of community rules.
In this subsection, we continue this exploration and make it more systematic using two lattice
structures enjoyed by the community-rule taxonomy.
Theorem 6 (Taxonomy: Lattice Structures of Community Rules). Let C denote the family of
all community rules that satisfies all eight axioms. Let CB be a superset of C that denotes the
family of all community rules that satisfies Axioms A, Mon, CRM, CRNM, WC, Emb.
1. The algebraic structure T = (C,∪,∩, Cclique, Ccomprehensive) forms a bounded lattice with
Cclique as the lattice’s bottom and Ccomprehensive as the lattice’s top.
2. The algebraic structure TB = (CB ,∪,∩, Cclique, Call) forms a bounded lattice with Cclique as
the lattice’s bottom and Call as the lattice’s top.
Proof. First, by definition, the two operations ∩ and ∪ over the community functions are both
communitative and associative. One can easily show that the two operations ∩ and ∪ satisfy
the absorption property, that is, for any two C1, C2 ∈ C
C1 ∪ (C1 ∩ C2) = C1.
C1 ∩ (C1 ∪ C2) = C1.
For example, to see the first one, for any affinity network A, we have
(C1 ∪ (C1 ∩ C2))(A) = C1(A) ∪ (C1 ∩ C2)(A) = C1(A) ∪ (C1(A) ∩ C2(A)) = C1(A).
To complete the proof that T and TB are lattices, we need to prove that T and TB are closed
under ∩ and ∪. We organize the arguments as following:
• A, WC: it is obvious that if C1 and C2 satisfies Axioms A and WC then both C1 ∪ C2 and
C1 ∩ C2 also satisfies Axioms A, WC.
• Mon, CRM, CRNM: Suppose A = (V,Π), A′ = (V,Π′), and S ⊂ V are, respectively,
two preference networks and a set considered in Axiom Mon. Then if C1 and C2 satisfy
Mon, we have S ∈ Ci(A
′) ⇒ S ∈ Ci(A) for i ∈ 1, 2. Thus, if S ∈ C1(A
′) ∩ C2(A
′) then
S ∈ C1(A)∩ C2(A), and if S ∈ C1(A
′)∪ C2(A
′) then S ∈ C1(A)∪ C2(A). Thus, both C1 ∪ C2
and C1 ∩ C2 also satisfy Axioms Mon. We can argue analogously for Axioms CRM and
CRNM.
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• Emb: If both C1 and C2 satisfy Emb, then for any A = (V,Π) and any “embedded world”
A′ = (V ′,Π′) such that Π,Π′ satisfy the assumption of Axiom Emb, we have Ci(A
′) =
Ci(A) ∩ 2
V ′ for i ∈ {1, 2}. So
C1(A
′) ∩ C2(A
′) =
(
C1(A) ∩ 2
V ′
)
∩
(
C2(A) ∩ 2
V ′
)
= (C1(A) ∩ C2(A)) ∩ 2
V ′
C1(A
′) ∪ C2(A
′) =
(
C1(A) ∩ 2
V ′
)
∪
(
C2(A) ∩ 2
V ′
)
= (C1(A) ∪ C2(A)) ∩ 2
V ′ .
Thus, both C1 ∪ C2 and C1 ∩ C2 also satisfies Axioms Emb.
Together, this shows that ∀C1, C2 ∈ CB, C1 ∩ C2 ∈ CB and C1 ∪ C2 ∈ CB. Thus, TB =
(CB ,∪,∩, Cclique, Call) is a lattice with Call as the lattice’s top and Cclique as the lattice’s bottom
(where the former follows from the fact that Call(A) satisfies Axioms A, Mon, CRM, CRNM, WC
and Emb, while the latter follows from Proposition 5).
• GS, SA: Assume C1 ∈ C and C2 ∈ C satisfy Axioms GS and SA. We can then argue as for
Axiom Mon above to show that both C1 ∪ C2 and C1 ∩ C2 satisfies Axioms GS, SA.
Thus, T = (C,∪,∩) is a lattice. By Theorem 5, Ccomprehensive is the lattice’s top and Cclique as
the lattice’s bottom of T .
Theorem 6 allows us to have a notion of the closure of an arbitrary community rule with
respect to these six axioms. In order to define it, we say that a community rule C2 contains a
rule C1 if C1(A) ⊂ C2(A) for all preference networks A.
Theorem 7. Given a community rule C, there exists a unique smallest community rule, denoted
C, that contains C and satisfies all community axioms besides SA and GS.
Proof. Consider the set Ĉ of all community rules that contain C and satisfy these six axioms.
Note that it is non-empty because Call is guaranteed to contain C. Apart from some technical
issues to be addressed below, if we take the intersection of all the communities in this set, the
resulting rule C will still satisfy all six axioms by the proof of Theorem 6, and thus be the
smallest community rule of the set.
The technical issues to which we alluded above stem from the fact that, in general, the set
Ĉ contains uncountably many community rules. The community rule C is thus defined by an
uncountable intersection, while Theorem 6 a priori only allows one to argue about countably
many intersections. But it turns out that while Ĉ is uncountable, when checking the axioms,
one never has to consider more than a finite set of rules, allowing one to apply the reasoning
from the proof of Theorem 6 to show that C does satisfy all desired axioms.
To make this precise, we recall that a community rule is given by a sequence of functions,
CV : (V,Π) 7→ CV (V,Π) ⊂ 2
V−∅, where V runs over the non-empty finite subsets of countable
reference set V0. Expressing both C and the rules in C
′ ∈ Ĉ as sequences, C = (CV ) and C
′ = (C′V ),
we have
CV ((V,Π)) =
⋂
C′∈Ĉ
C′V ((V,Π)).
Hoverer, when verifying the six axioms for C, we only have to deal with a given finite set V at a
time (or, in the case of Axiom Emb, all subsets V ′ ⊂ V of a finite set V ); and for a finite set V ,
CV can be expressed as the intersection over a finite subset of Ĉ, which means when checking
the axioms for CV , we can use Theorem 6.
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The Intersection lemma serves as a bridge between the two lattices from Theorem 6: We can
obtain the lattice T = (C,∪,∩, Cclique, Ccomprehensive) from the lattice TB = (CB ,∪,∩, Cclique, Call)
by intersecting the community functions on the lattice points of TB with CGS ∩CSA, followed by
merging the lattices points with identical community functions. By moving the intersection up
the lattice TB, we can define more inclusive community rules that satisfy all eight axioms. For
example, by intersecting the lattice top (Call) of TB with CGS ∩ CSA, we obtain the lattice top
(Ccomprehensive) of T .
Remark 1. Note that Theorem 7 and the Intersection Lemma give us a reasonable mapping
from arbitrary community rules to community rules that satisfy all our axioms. Namely, for
a given community rule, C, first take the unique smallest community rule that contains C and
satisfies all axioms besides SA and GS (as in Theorem 7), then apply the intersection from the
Intersection Lemma. The mapping can therefore be formulated as
C 7−→ C∩CSA∩CGS.
As an example, consider the community rule C1 that admits all singletons (i.e., subsets of
size 1) as communities and nothing else. Because C1 only violates WC of the axioms besides
SA, C1 in addition to all singletons also contains all cliques (thanks to the influence of Emb).
From this, all communities that don’t satisfy SA are removed: i.e., all singletons that do not
rank themselves first. As the reader may have already guessed, what remains happens to be the
Clique Rule. In other words,
C1∩CSA∩CGS = Cclique
In a small step up the lattice TB from the Clique Rule, we consider the following community
function.
Rule 4 (Relaxed Clique Rule). For a non-negative function g : N → N ∪ {0}, a non-empty
subset S ⊆ V is a community in A = (V,Π) if and only if ∀u, s ∈ S, pis(u) ∈ [1 : |S| + g(|S|)].
We denote this community function by CClique(g).
Proposition 15. CClique(g) ∈ CB and hence (CClique(g) ∩ CGS ∩ CSA) satisfies all eight axioms.
Proof. The (straightforward) proof is left to the reader.
We will show in Section 5 below that Ccomprehensive is highly “non-constructive” by proving
that the decision problem for determining whether a subset in a preference network satisfies
Axiom Self-Approval or Group Stability is coNP-complete. On the other hand, we will see that
the community rule given by (CClique(g) ∩ CGS ∩ CSA) can be constructive if g is small, see
Proposition 17 in Section 5 below.
As g varies from 0 to ∞, the community function CClique(g) moves up the lattice TB from
Cclique to Call. The intersection with CSA∩CGS provides us a “vertical” glimpse of the taxonomy
lattice T . In particular, as the community rules along this vertical path become more inclusive
(when g increases), they become less constructive for community identification. An alternative
“vertical” glimpse can be gained by following “harmonious-path” in the lattice TB for community
rules formulated by pairwise comparisons.
Rule 5 (Harmonious Path). For λ ∈ [0 : 1], a non-empty subset S is a λ-harmonious community
in A = (V,Π) if ∀u ∈ S, v ∈ V − S, at least λ-fraction of {pis : s ∈ S} prefer u over v. We
denote this community function by Hλ.
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Using the similar argument as in Theorem 4, we can prove
Proposition 16. For all λ ∈ [0 : 1], Hλ ∈ CB. Thus, Hλ ∩CGS ∩ CSA satisfies all eight axioms,
∀λ ∈ [0 : 1]. Further, for λ ∈ (1/2 : 1], Hλ satisfies Axiom SA, and therefore all axioms but
Axiom GS.
Proof. The (easy) proof is left to the reader.
Therefore, as λ varies from 1 to 0, the community function Hλ moves up the lattice TB from
H1 = Cclique to H0 = Call, and so does its non-constructiveness, see Proposition 18 in Section 5.
5 Complexity of Community Rules
5.1 Complexity of determining Group Stability and Self Approval
In this section, we demonstrate that Ccomprehensive is highly “non-constructive” by showing that
the decision problem for determining whether a subset in a preference network satisfies Axiom
Self-Approval or Group Stability is coNP-complete. Our reduction also provides examples of
preference networks derived from 3-SAT instances.
Theorem 8. It is coNP-complete to determine whether a subset S ⊂ V is self-approving in a
given preference network A = (V,Π).
Before starting the proof, we introduce a notation which we will use throughout this section.
Given a preference profile (V,Π) and a non-empty set S ⊂ V , we say that a set G′ ⊂ V − S is a
witness that S is not self-approving, if S lexicographically prefers G′ to S, and we say that a pair
(G,G′) ⊂ S × (V − S) is a witness that S is not group-stable if S −G lexicographically prefers
G′ to G. Finally, we say that G ⊂ S threatens the stability of S if there exists a G′ ⊂ V − S
such that S −G lexicographically prefers G′ to G.
Proof. We reduce 3-SAT to this decision problem: Suppose c = (c1, . . . , cm) is a 3-SAT instance
with Boolean variables x = (x1, . . . , xn) (i.e., cj = {uj , vj , wj} ⊂ ∪
n
i=1{xi, x¯i} ). We define a
preference network as follows:
• V = A∪B∪D∪X hasm+n+m+2n members, where A = {a1, . . . , am}, B = {b1, . . . , bn},
D = {d1, . . . , dm}, and X = {x1, . . . , xn, x¯1, . . . , x¯n}. The distinguished subset will be
S = A ∪B, and for convenience we will denote its complement as U = D ∪X.
• Since we will focus on subset S, here we only define the preferences of members in S. The
preferences of U can be chosen arbitrarily.
– Member bi has preference D ≻ A ≻ {xi, x¯i} ≻ {bi} ≻ X − {xi, x¯i} ≻ B − {bi}, where
preferences between elements of each set can be chosen arbitrarily.
– Member aj has preference cj ≻ {aj} ≻ D ∪ X − cj ≻ B ∪ A − {aj}, where again
preferences between elements of each set are arbitrary.
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Intuitively, members of A are used to enforce clause consistency (i.e., make sure each clause
is satisfied) and members of B are used to enforce variable consistency (no variable to both true
and false at the same time). Subsets of X naturally constitute an assignment of the variables,
and D provides necessary padding in order to apply Self-Approval.
We now show that S is not self-approving if and only if the 3-SAT instance is satisfiable.
In one direction, suppose Y = {y1, . . . , yn} where yi ∈ {x1, x¯i} is a satisfying assignment
for the 3-SAT instance. Let G′ = Y ∪D. Now consider the bijection, f , where f(aj) = dj and
f(bi) = yi. It is not hard to see that for all s ∈ S and all i, f(s) ≻πbi s. All that is left is to find
similar bijections for each aj . First, note that for aj all bijections fj trivially satisfy fj(s) ≻πaj s
where s ∈ B ∪A− {aj}, since this set is ranked at the bottom of piaj . Therefore it is sufficient
to show that there exists an element of G′ that aj prefers to itself. This happens so long as
one of the literals from its clause is in G′, which must be true by the fact that Y is a satisfying
assignment.
In the other direction, suppose G′ ⊂ U = D∪X is a witness that S is not self-approving. We
note the following:
• D ⊂ G′ otherwise any bi will have a member of A that cannot be mapped to a more
preferred member of G′.
• Let Y = X ∩G′. Then |Y | = n by the above fact and the fact that |G′| = n+m.
• {xi, x¯i} ∩ G
′ 6= ∅ by bi’s preference, and by the pigeonhole principle the literals of Y are
consistent (i.e. {xi, x¯i} * Y ).
• cj ∩ Y 6= ∅ by aj ’s preferences.
Therefore the variable assignment implied by Y is a satisfying assignment for the 3-SAT
instance.
The following “padding” lemma allows us to reduce various complexity results concerning
community axioms to Theorem 8.
Lemma 2. Let ∅ 6=S ⊂ V ⊂ V ′ be such that the size of S˜ = V ′ − V is at least |S|, and let
S′ = S ∪ S˜. Then each preference profile Π on V can be mapped onto a preference profile Π′ on
V ′ such that
(i) S′ ∈ CGS(V
′,Π′) ∩ CSA(V
′,Π′)⇔ S′ ∈ CGS(V
′,Π′).
(ii) S′ ∈ CGS(V
′,Π′)⇔ S ∈ CSA(V,Π).
Proof. Since |S˜| ≥ |S|, we can find a surjective map g : S˜ → S. Given such a map, define Π′
arbitrarily, except for the following two constraints:
• If s ∈ S, then pi′s ranks all of S
′ = S˜ ∪ S before anyone in V − S = V ′ − S′;
• If s˜ ∈ S˜, then pi′s˜ ranks all of S˜ first, and then gives the rank pi
′
s˜(v) = |S˜|+pig(s˜)(v) to every
v ∈ V = V ′ − S˜.
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Since every s ∈ S ⊂ S′ ranks all of S′ before V ′ − S′, no subset G′ ⊂ V ′ − S′ can be lexico-
graphically preferred by pi′s to a subset of S
′. As a consequence, S′ is trivially self-approving
with respect to Π′, proving statement (i).
Furthermore, G cannot threaten the stability of S′ if G ⊂ S′ is such that (S′−G)∩S 6= ∅. If
G ⊂ S′ threatens the stability of S′, we therefore must have that G ⊃ S. On the other hand, if
G ) S, then G contains an element s˜ ∈ S˜ which means that no set G′ can be lexicographically
preferred G, since all elements of S′ prefer all of S˜ to anyone in V ′ − S′.
Thus G can only threaten the stability of S′ if G = S. In other words, S /∈ CGS(Π
′) if and
only if there exists G′ ⊂ V ′−S′ such that for all s˜ ∈ S˜ = S′−G, G′ is lexicographically preferred
to S with respect to pi′s˜ = pig(s˜). Since by assumption, the image of S˜ under g is all of S, this is
equivalent to the statement that for all s ∈ S, G′ is lexicographically preferred to S with respect
to pis, which is the condition that G
′ is a witness to S /∈ CSA(Π), proving statement (ii).
Given this lemma, the next two theorems are immediate corollaries to Theorem 8.
Theorem 9. It is coNP-complete to determine whether a subset S ⊂ V is group-stable in a
given preference network A = (V,Π).
Theorem 10. It is coNP-complete to determine whether a subset S ⊂ V is a member of
Ccomprehensive = CGS ∩ CSA for a given preference network A = (V,Π).
5.2 Complexity of the rules CClique(g) and Hλ
We now prove although testing membership for Ccomprehensive = CGS ∩ CSA is co-NP complete,
the community rule given by (CClique(g) ∩ CGS ∩ CSA) can be constructive if g is small.
Proposition 17. Given a preference network A = (V,Π) and a subset S ⊆ V , then we can
determine in O(2g|S|g+3) time whether or not S ∈ (CClique(g) ∩ CGS ∩ CSA)(A). Particularly, if
g = Θ(1), then this decision problem is in P. However, the decision problem is co-NP complete
for g = |S|δ for any constant δ ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. It takes time O(|S|2) to check whether S ∈ CClique(g).
Next we show that it takes timeO(|S|32g) to check if S ∈ CSA(A). Indeed, supposeG
′ ⊆ V−S
is a witness that S /∈ CSA(A). We claim that this implies that G
′ ⊂ pi−1s ([1 : |S| + g]) ∀s ∈ S.
Suppose this is not true for some s ∈ S. Then ∃v ∈ G′ such that pis(v) > |S|+ g, which in turn
implies that v ≺πs u∀u ∈ G as pis(u) ∈ [1 : |S| + g] ∀u ∈ G. Thus there exists no bijection
fs : S → G
′ with the property f−1s (v) ≺πs v, contradicting the assumption that G
′ ⊆ V − S is
a witness that S 6∈ CGS(A). We can thus identify the set of all witnesses as follows: (1) Choose
s ∈ S, and let Ts = pi
−1
s ([1 : |S|+g])−S. (2) Choose a subset G
′ ⊆ Ts. (3) Test if G
′ is a witness
that S 6∈ CSA(A). First note that we are dealing with at most |S|2
g subsets. By Proposition 1,
we can conduct the test of Step 3 performing |S| integer sorting. Thus, the total complexity for
Steps 1-3 is O(|S|32g).
We can similarly test for group stability for S ∈ CClique(g). Suppose (G,G
′) is a witness that
S 6∈ CGS(A). Then, it must be the case that G
′ ⊂ pi−1s ([1 : |S| + g]) ∀s ∈ S − G. Suppose
this is not true for some s ∈ S − G. Then there must be a v ∈ G′ such that v ≺πs u,∀u ∈ G
as u ∈ pi−1s ([1 : |S| + g]), which implies that there exists no bijection fs : G → G
′ with the
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property f−1(v) ≺πs v, contradicting the assumption that (G ⊂ S,G
′ ⊆ V −S) is a witness that
S 6∈ CGS(A).
We say G′ is a potential witness to S 6∈ CGS(A) if there exists G ⊂ S, such that (G,G
′) is a
witness to S 6∈ CGS(A). We can identify the set of all potential witnesses as follows: (1) Choose
s ∈ S, and let Ts = pi
−1
s ([1 : |S| + g]) − S. (2) Choose a subset of G
′ ⊆ Ts. (3) Test if G
′ is
a potential witness. Again, we are dealing with at most |S|2g subsets. As there are at most
|S||G
′| ≤ |S|g candidates G to test for (using Proposition 1), Steps 1-3 takes at most O(2g|S|g+3)
time.
To show that for large g the problem of determining whether or not a set lies in CClique(g) ∩
CGS ∩ CSA is in co-NP, we reduce the problem to the one of determining whether for a given
preference network A = (V,Π), a set S ⊂ V is a member of (CGS ∩ CSA)(A). To define the
reduction, we enlarge both V and S by a large, disjoint set S˜: V = V ′ ∪ S˜, S′ = S ∪ S˜,
where S˜ is chosen large enough to guarantee that g(|S˜|) ≥ |V |, implying in particular that
|S′|+g(|S′|) ≥ |S′|+ |V | ≥ |S˜|+ |V | = |V ′|. Due to this fact, we have that S′ ∈ CClique(g)(V
′,Π′)
for all preference profiles Π′ on V ′. The statement now follows with the help of Lemma 2 and
Theorem 8.
Our final proposition in this subsection concerns the complexity of determining whether a
set S lies in the class Hλ.
Proposition 18. Given a preference network A = (V,Π) and a subset S ⊆ V , we can determine
in polynomial time whether S ∈ (Hλ∩CGS∩CSA)(A) if (1−λ)|S| < 2, while it is co-NP complete
to answer this question if (1− λ)|S| ≥ 16.
Proof. We start with the proof of the positive statement. To this end, we first note that it takes
(|V | − |S|)|S|2 = O(|V |3) comparisions to check whether S ∈ Hλ.
Next we show that if S ∈ Hλ, then the only groups G ⊂ S that can threaten the stability of
S are those for which
|S −G| ≤ 2⌊(1 − λ)|S|⌋ − 1.
Indeed, assume that (G,G′) is a witness for S /∈ CGS(Π), and let g = |G|. The assumption that
S ∈ Hλ then implies that for all (u, v) ∈ G×G
′ ⊂ S × (V − S), there are at most
m = |S| − ⌈λ|S|⌉ = ⌊(1− λ)|S|⌋
elements s ∈ S−G ⊂ S such that v ≻πs u. Thus the sum over all triples (u, v, s) ∈ G×G
′×(S−G)
obeying this condition can be at most g2m. On the other hand, if s lexicographically prefers G′
over G, the number of pairs (u, v) ∈ G×G′) obeying the above condition is at least g(g+1)2 , given
a lower bound of |S−G|g(g+1)2 on the above number of triples. This proves that |S−G| ≤
2g
g+1m,
and hence |S−G| ≤ 2m−1, where in the last step we used that both |S−G| and m are integers.
Thus for (1−λ)|S| < 2, we may assume that G−S has size 1 (the case G−S = ∅ is trivial),
which shows that there are at most |S| possible choices for G. Given G, we then only have to
check whether a potential G′ ⊂ V −S is lexicographically preferred to G by a single linear order
pis, where s is the single element of S −G. Using Proposition 1, the existence of such a G
′ can
be checked by greedily choosing the first |G| elements of V − S with respect to pis. If this set is
lexicographically preferred to G, we know that S /∈ CGS, and if for all G considered in the first
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step, the greedily found G′ is not lexicographically preferred to G, S ∈ CGS. Since all S ∈ Hλ
are self-approving when λ > 1/2, this completes the proof of the positive statement.
To prove the negative statement, we use that it is NP-complete to determine whether in a
formula consisting of 3-clauses, every clause is satisfied by exactly one literal in the clause, and
that this problem stays NP complete if we restrict ourselves to the case where each variable
appears in exactly 3 clauses (cubic 1-in-3 SAT) [12]. Note that this means that we can partition
the set of clauses into k = 7 classes such that the clauses in each class don’t share any variables
(to see this, consider the graph obtained by joining two clauses whenever they share a variable;
this graph has maximal degree at most 6, and hence can be colored by 7 colors, given the desired
partition).
Thus consider n boolean variables {x1, . . . , xn} and k sets of 3-in-1 clauses Ci such that
the clauses in each Ci have no common variables. We define X as the set of literals, X =
{x1, x¯1, . . . , xn, x¯n}, and choose two additional sets Y and T , of size n and 2k + 2, respectively.
It will be convenient to label the elements of Y as y1, . . . , yn, and the elements of T as 1, . . . , 2k+2.
Set
S = Y ∪ T and V = S ∪X,
and choose Π′ ∈ L(V )V of the form
• If s ∈ Y , pi′s ranks all of T first, followed by everyone in Y , followed by everyone in X
• If s ∈ T , pi′s ranks all of T first, then ranks V − T according to a yet to be determined
pis ∈ L(Y ∪X).
• If v ∈ V − S, pi′v is arbitrary.
With this ranking, everyone in Y ranks all of S above all of V , showing that S ∈ Hλ((V,Π
′))
as long as |S − Y | ≤ (1− γ)|S|, i.e., as long as (1− γ)|S| ≥ 2(k + 1) = c2. It also shows that S
is self-approving, since everyone in S prefers all of T to all of V − S, which does not allow for
a subset G′ ⊂ V − S such that G′ is lexicographically preferred to S by everyone in S. By the
same reasoning we also see that S is group-stable against any subgroup G which has a non-zero
intersection with T . Finally, S is also stable against any subgroup G such that Y \G 6= ∅, since
for such a subset, S − G contains an element s ∈ Y which prefers everyone in S to everyone
outside S.
Thus the only subgroup G against which S could be unstable is the set G = Y , i.e., S /∈
(Hλ∩CGS∩CSA)(V,Π
′) if and only if there exists a subsetG′ ⊂ X such that G′ is lexicographically
preferred to G = Y by everyone in T . We now show that by defining Π appropriately, such a G′
exists if and only if the the 1-in-3 SAT problem given by C1, . . . , Ck has a satisfying assignment.
We first define pi1 and pi2:
pi1 = [x1, x¯1, y1, . . . , xn, x¯n, yn]
pi2 = [xn, x¯n, yn, . . . , x1, x¯1, y1].
Clearly, G′ is lexicographically preferred to G by both pi1 and pi2 if G
′ contains exactly one of
xi and x¯i for each i. On the other hand, if G
′ is lexicographically preferred to G by pi1, then by
Proposition 1, G′ must contain at least one of x1 and x¯1, and if it is lexicographically preferred
to G by pi2, it can contain at most one of x1 and x¯1. Continuing by induction, we see that G
′
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is lexicographically preferred to G by both pi1 and pi2 if and only if G
′ contains exactly one of
xi, x¯i for all i, i.e., if G
′ corresponds to a truth assignment for the variables x1, . . . , xn.
In a similar way, if Ci consists of the clauses {z1, z2, z3}, {z4, z5, z6}, . . . , {z3ℓ−2, z3ℓ−1, zℓ} ⊂
X, we define
pi2i+1 = [z1, z2, z3, y1, z4, z5, z6, y2, . . . , z3ℓ−2, z3ℓ1 , zℓ, yℓ, Q]
pi2i+2 = [Q, z3ℓ−2, z3ℓ1 , zℓ, yℓ, . . . , z4, z5, z6, y2, z1, z2, z3, y1],
where Q ranks everyone in X − {z1, . . . , z3ℓ} before the remaining elements yℓ+1, . . . , yn ∈ Y .
Now the first ranking enforces that at least one literal of the clause {z1, z2, z3} is chosen, while
the last enforces that there is at most one such literal. Combining these two and continuing by
induction, we see that G′ is lexicographically preferred to G by both pi2i+1 and pi2i+2 if and only
if exactly one literal of each clause in Ci is chosen.
Putting everything together, we see that the 3-in-1 SAT problem has a satisfying assignment
if and only if S /∈ (Hλ ∩ CGS ∩ CSA)(V,Π
′).
5.3 Number of Potential Communities
Proposition 19. Assume that n ≥ 8. There exists a preference network A = (V,Π) such that
Ccomprehensive(A) ≥ 2
n/2.
Proof. The preference profile, ΠH&S , that is about to be described has been dubbed the “hero
and sidekick” example as will soon become clear. Consider a world composed of n/2 hero-
sidekick duos. Each member of a hero-sidekick duo first prefers the hero of that duo then the
sidekick of the duo, then all other heroes, followed lastly by all other sidekicks (in some fixed
but arbitrary order). Now consider a subset, S, that is composed of all heroes and an arbitrary
set of sidekicks. Note that because there are 2n/2 different sets of sidekicks, it is sufficient to
show that S is a community in Ccomprehensive([n],ΠH&S).
First, note that S clearly satisfies SA.
To show that S satisfies GS, consider two sets G ⊂ S and G′ ⊂ V − S of equal size. We first
note that it will be enough to consider the case where (S − G) × G contains no hero-sidekick
pair (u, v), since otherwise u would prefer v over everyone else, in particular over everyone in G′.
Applying this to the sidekicks in G, we conclude that G must contain at least as many heros as
sidekicks. On the other hand, G′ can’t be lexicographically preferred to G if G contains at least
two heros, showing that only two cases are possible: G consisting of a hero-sidekick pair, or G
made up of just a single hero. But neither one leads to a counter example if |S−G| > |G| = |G′|,
since then we can find an s ∈ S−G which is not the partner of any sidekick in G′, which means
that s prefers the hero in G to everyone in G′. Since S contains all heros by assumption, we see
that S is group stable as soon as n ≥ 8.
6 Stability of Communities
In this section, we consider several stability measures and their impact on community structures.
In particular, we focus on preference perturbations in Section 6.1 and the concept of stable fixed
points of an aggregation function in Section 6.2. In both subsections, we will use B3CT self-
determined communities as our main examples to illustrate these measures. In Section 6.3, we
will study the structure of stable harmonious communities.
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6.1 Community Stability with Respect to Preference Perturbations
We first study the structure of self-determined communities that remain self-determined even
after a certain degree of changes in their members’ preferences.
Definition 10 (Preference Perturbations). Let ∅ 6=S ⊆ V , and let Π, Π′ be two preference
profiles over V . For 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, we say Π′ is a δ-perturbation of Π with respect to S if
max
v∈V
∣∣{i ∈ S : pii(v) 6= pi′i(v)}∣∣ ≤ δ|S|.
Given any community rule C and a preference network A = (V,Π), we say that a community
S ∈ C(A) is stable under δ-perturbations if S ∈ C((V,Π′)) for all Π′ that are δ-perturbation of
Π with respect to S.
In other words, a preference profile is a δ-perturbation of another profile if, for each v ∈ V ,
at most a δ-fraction of the members of S changed their preference of v. Recalling Definition 6,
we now state our first stability result for B3CT self-determined communities.
Proposition 20. For any preference network A = (V,Π), if S ⊂ V is a B3CT self-determined
community that is stable under δ-perturbations, then ∃α > δ such that S is an (α,α− δ)-B3CT
community. Conversely, if S ⊂ V is an (α, β)-B3CT self-determined community, then it is
stable under (α− β)/2-perturbations.
Proof. Let u∗ = argmin{φΠS (u) : u ∈ S}, and let α = φ
Π
S (u
∗)/|S|. We now prove that the
condition of the proposition implies α > δ. Suppose this is not true. Letting T = {s ∈ S :
pis(u
∗) ≤ |S|}, we have |T | = α|S| ≤ δ|S|. Now consider a preference profile Π′ such that for
s ∈ T , pi′v shifts the ranking of u
∗ to n while maintaining the relatively rankings of all other
elements in pis, and pi
′
v = piv ∀v 6∈ T . Then, as the ranking of u
∗ is more than |S| in every pi′s for
s ∈ S, we conclude that S is not a B3CT self-determined community in (V,Π′), contradicting the
assumption that S is stable under δ-perturbations. Now let v∗ = argmax{φΠS (v) : v ∈ V − S},
and let β = φΠS (v
∗)/|S|. We can similarly show that if S is stable under δ-perturbations, then
β < α− δ.
The second direction of the proposition is straightforward.
Thus, the main result of [3] can be restated as: there are at most nO(1/δ) B3CT communities
that are stable under δ-perturbations. We further refine the stability studies of community
functions by introducing the notion of membership-preserving perturbation:
Definition 11. Let (V,Π) be a preference network, and let ∅ 6=S ⊂ V . A preference profile Π′
on V is a membership-preserving perturbation of Π with respect to S if ∀s ∈ S, pis(S) = pi
′
s(S).
Note that the preference profile Π′ considered in both Axiom CRNM and CRM are special
cases of membership-preserving perturbations; in Axiom CRNM, ΠS and Π
′
S agree on S (i.e., for
all s, u ∈ S, pis(u) = pi
′
s(u), implying in particular pis(S) = pi
′
s(S)), and in Axiom CRM, ΠS and
Π′S agree on V −S (i.e., for all s ∈ S, v ∈ V −S, pis(v) = pi
′
s(v), implying pis(V −S) = pi
′
s(V −S))
and hence also pis(S) = pi
′
s(S).
Theorem 11. For any preference network A = (V,Π), the number of B3CT communities that
are stable under membership-preserving, δ-perturbations of Π is polynomial in nO(1/δ).
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Proof. It will be sufficient to show that if a B3CT community S is stable under membership-
preserving, δ-perturbations of Π, then either
1. S is an (α,α − δ)-B3CT community for some α > δ, or
2. ∃s ∈ S such that pis(S) = [1 : |S|].
Indeed, in the first case, there are at most nO(1/δ) many (α,α − δ)-B3CT communities by [3],
and in the second case, we have that all communities are of the form S = pi−1v ([1 : k]) for some
s ∈ V and k ∈ [n], showing that there are at most n2 such communities.
To establish the above statement, letting u∗ = argmin{φΠS (u) : u ∈ S} and α = φ
Π
S (u
∗)/|S|,
we now prove that if S is not an (α,α − δ)-B3CT community, then there must be s ∈ S,
pis[1 : |S|] = S. The assumption that S is not an (α,α − δ)-B
3CT community implies that
φΠS (v
∗)/|S| ≥ α − δ where v∗ = argmax{φΠS (v) : v ∈ V − S}. Let T = {s ∈ S : pis(v
∗) ≤ |S|}.
Then, |T | = φΠS (v
∗) ≥ (α− δ)|S|. Since S is a B3CT community, we know that |T | < α|S|.
Using these conditions, we now define a perturbed preference profile. Key to our construction
is the following observation: For each s ∈ S−T , if pis(S) 6= [1 : |S|], then (V −S)∩pis[1 : |S|] 6= ∅.
Thus, there exists pi′s that agrees with pis on S and pi
′
s(v
∗) ≤ |S| – we can simply swap v∗ with
any element in (V −S)∩pis[1 : |S|]. Thus, either there exists s ∈ S−T such that pis(S) = [1 : |S|]
(which implies Case 2 above), or pis(S) 6= [1 : |S|],∀s ∈ S − T . The latter implies that we can
find a set S˜ ⊂ S−T of size α|S|−|T | ≤ δ|S| and a membership-preserving, δ-perturbations Π′ of
Π such that pi′s(v
∗) ≤ |S| for all s ∈ T ∪ S˜, implying that S is not a B3CT community in (V,Π′).
This contradicts the assumption that S is stable under membership-preserving, δ-perturbations
of Π.
6.2 Stable Fixed-Points of Social Choice
We can also strengthen the concept of fixed points in our social choice based community frame-
work. Particularly, we measure the stability of a community defined by a fixed-point rule
according to some variation of the following definition.
Definition 12. (δ-Strong Fixed Points) Let A = (V,Π) be a preference netowrk, F :
L(V )∗ → L(V ) be a preference aggregation function, and δ ∈ [0 : 1] be a coherence parame-
ter. Then, S ∈ CF ((V,Π)) is δ-strong if for ∀T ⊆ S such that |T | ≥ (1− δ) · |S|,
u ≻F (ΠT ) v ∀u ∈ S, v ∈ V − S.
Our goal is to understand the influence of a preference aggregation function F and the
stability parameter δ (0 ≤ δ ≤ 1) on the structure of the δ-strong F -self-determined communities.
Before discussing this further, we point out some subtleties that arise when applying Defini-
tion 12 to general aggregation functions. We illustrate this subtlety using weighted fixed-point
rules, and, in particular, by comparing the community rule defined by the B3CT voting function
to that defined by the Borda count.
Recall that in Definition 8, for preference networks with n elements, a preference aggregation
function is determined by a sequence of weighting vectors W = (w1, w2, . . . ) where wk ∈ Rn,
denotes the weights for the aggregation of k preferences. While this weight vector is independent
of k for the Borda count, it in general can be different for each k, and indeed does depend
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on k for B3CT voting. Concretely, for the Borda count, every voting member gives scores
n, n− 1, . . . , 1 to the members of V , while in B3CT voting, it gives a score of 1 to the first k in
her preference list, making her scores dependent on the total number of voters, k. Thus when
defining self-determined communities with the Borda count, one does not need to first anticipate
the community size before aggregating the preferences of its members, but when defining self-
determined communities with B3CT voting, the weight assigned to an element by a preference
depends on the size of the subset under consideration.
In this regard, when measuring the stability of a community S, Definition 12 uses the same
weighting vector to evaluate F (ΠT ) and F (ΠS) for the Borda count based community rule,
while it uses different weighting vectors to evaluate F (ΠT ) and F (ΠS) for the B
3CT community
rule, and these weighting vectors depend on |T |. Thus, the former application of Definition 12
appears more natural than the latter application.
As a result, we will use the following variation of Definition 12 to measure the strength of a
B3CT community.
Definition 13 (δ-Strong B3CT Communities). For each T ⊆ V and i ∈ V , let φΠT,k(i) denote
the number of votes that member i would receive if each member s ∈ T were casting a vote for
each of its k most preferred members according to its preference pis.
For δ ∈ [0 : 1], a non-empty set S ⊆ V is a δ-strong B3CT community in A = (V,Π) if
∀u ∈ S, v ∈ V − S and T ⊆ S such that |T | ≥ (1− δ) · |S|,
φΠT,|S|(u) > φ
Π
T,|S|(v) ∀u ∈ S, v ∈ V − S.
Proposition 21. If S is a δ-strong B3CT community of A = (V,Π), then ∃α ≥ δ such that S
is an (α,α − δ)-B3CT community.
Proof. Let u∗ = argmin{φΠS (u) : u ∈ S}, and let α = φ
Π
S (u
∗)/|S| and let v∗ = argmax{φΠS (v) :
v ∈ V − S}, and let β = φΠS (v
∗)/|S|. We now prove that α− β > δ.
The pair u∗ and v∗ partitions S into four subsets.
S0 = {s ∈ S : (pis(u
∗) 6∈ [1 : |S|]) and (pis(v
∗) 6∈ [1 : |S|])}
S1 = {s ∈ S : (pis(u
∗) 6∈ [1 : |S|]) and (pis(v
∗) ∈ [1 : |S|])}
S2 = {s ∈ S : (pis(u
∗) ∈ [1 : |S|]) and (pis(v
∗) 6∈ [1 : |S|])}
S3 = {s ∈ S : (pis(u
∗) ∈ [1 : |S|]) and (pis(v
∗) ∈ [1 : |S|])}
Then
|S0|+ |S1|+ |S2|+ |S3| = |S|,
|S1|+ |S3| = β · |S|,
|S2|+ |S3| = α · |S|,
|S0|+ 2|S1|+ |S3| < (1− δ) · |S|,
where the last inequality follows from the assumption that S is a δ-strong B3CT-self-determined
community.
To see this, we first note that |S1| < |S2| due to the fact that β < α. Define T to be the union
of S0, S1, S3, and S˜2, where S˜2 ⊂ S2 is an arbitrary subset of size |S1|. Assume by contradiction
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that |T | ≥ (1− δ)|S|. Since S is a δ-strong B3CT-self-determined community, this would imply
that φT,|S|(u
∗) > φT,|S|(v
∗), i.e.
0 <
∑
s∈T
(
1πs(u∗)≤|S| − 1πs(v∗)≤|S|
)
.
But the right hand side is equal to |S˜2| − |S1| = 0, leading to a contradiction. Therefore,
|T | < (1− δ) · |S|, as claimed.
Subtracting the fourth of the above equations from the first, we obtain (|S0|+ |S1|+ |S2|+
|S3|)− (|S0|+ 2|S1|+ |S3|) = (|S2|+ |S3|)− (|S1|+ |S3|) > |S| − (1− δ) · |S| = δ · |S|. Thus, by
the second and third equation, we have α · |S| − β · |S| > δ · |S|.
Proposition 22. For any δ ∈ (0, 1), the number of δ-strong B3CT communities in any prefer-
ence network is nO(1/δ).
Proof. This follows from the main result of [3] and Proposition 21 above.
6.3 Stable Harmonious Communities
Applying the stability notions of Sections 6.1 and 6.2, we define two types of stable harmonious
communities. Before doing so, we recall the definition of harmonious communities, Definition 5,
and the definition of λ-harmonious communities from Rule 5.
Definition 14 (Stable Harmonious Communities). For δ ∈ [0 : 1/2], a non-empty subset S is a
δ-stable harmonious community in A = (V,Π) if S is (δ + 1/2)-harmonious, i.e., if ∀u ∈ S, v ∈
V −S, at least (1/2+δ)-fraction of {pis : s ∈ S} prefer u over v. For δ ∈ [0 : 1], S is a δ-strong
harmonious community in A if ∀u ∈ S, v ∈ V − S and T ⊆ S such that |T | ≥ (1 − δ) · |S|, the
majority of {pis : s ∈ T} prefer u over v.
Note that a δ-stable harmonious community is not quite the same as a harmonious com-
munity stable under δ-perturbations as defined in Section 6.1. Instead, we have that a δ-stable
harmonious community is a harmonious community that is stable under any δ′-perturbations as
long as δ′ < δ/2, and that conversely, a harmonious community that is stable under δ pertur-
bation is a δ-stable harmonious community. By contrast, the definition of δ-strong harmonious
communities maps exactly to the definition given in Section 6.2.
Proposition 23. If S is a δ-strong harmonous community, then S is a δ/2-stable harmonious
community.
Proof. For each pair u ∈ S, v ∈ V − S, let f(u, v) = |{s ∈ S : u ≻πs v}| − |{s ∈ S : u ≺πs v}|
be the preference gap between u and v with respect to S. Suppose (u∗, v∗) = argmin{f(u, v) :
u ∈ S, v ∈ V − S}. We now show that if S is a δ-strong harmonous community of A, then
f(u∗, v∗) > δ · |S|. The pair u∗ and v∗ partitions S into two subsets. S≻ = {s ∈ S : u
∗ ≻πs v
∗}
and S≺ = {s ∈ S : u
∗ ≺πs v
∗}. We have |S≻|+ |S≺| = |S| and |S≻| > |S≺|. Let T be the union
of S≺ and |S≺| arbitrary members of S≻. Since members of T are indifferent about u
∗ and v∗,
we have |T | = 2|S≺| ≤ (1 − δ) · |S|. Thus f(u
∗, v∗) = |S≻| − |S≺| = (|S≻| + |S≺|) − 2|S≺| ≥
|S| − (1− δ) · |S| = δ · |S|. Thus, |S≻| > (1/2 + δ/2) · |S|, and at least (1/2 + δ/2)-fraction of ΠS
prefer u∗ over v∗.
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With a simple probabilistic argument, we can bound the number of δ-stable harmonious
communities in any preference networks.
Theorem 12. ∀δ ≤ 1/2, the number of δ-stable harmonious communities in any preference
network is n12 logn/δ
2
.
Proof. Let S be a δ-stable harmonious communities. For any multi-set T ⊆ S, we say T identifies
S if for all u ∈ S and v ∈ V −S, the majority of T prefer u to v. Note that such a T determines
S once the size of S is set. To see this, note that the condition implies that u ≻F (ΠT ) v for all
(u, v) ∈ S × (V − S), which in turn implies that S is of the form V1 ∪ · · · ∪ Vi where (V1, V2, . . . )
are the components of the ordered partition F (ΠT ), ordered in such a way that V1 ≻F (ΠT ) V2, ...
(see Proposition 10 and its proof). Thus once F (ΠT ) and the size of S are fixed, S is uniquely
determined.
We now show that ∃T ⊂ V of size 12 log n/δ2 that identifies S. To this end, we consider a
sample T ⊂ S of k = 12 log n/δ2 randomly chosen elements (with replacements). We analyze
the probability that T identifies S. Let T = {t1, ..., tk}, and for each u ∈ S and v ∈ V − S, let
x
(u,v)
i = [u ≻πti v], where [B] denotes the indicator varable of an event B. Then T identifies S
iff
∑k
i=1 x
(u,v)
i > k/2,∀u ∈ S, v ∈ V − S. We now focus on a particular (u, v) pair and bound
Pr
[∑k
i=1 x
(u,v)
i ≤ k/2
]
. We first note that
E
[
k∑
i=1
x
(u,v)
i
]
=
k∑
i=1
E
[
x
(u,v)
i
]
≥
(
1
2
+ δ
)
· k.
By a standard use of the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound
Pr
[
k∑
i=1
x
(u,v)
i ≤ k/2
]
≤ Pr
[
k∑
i=1
x
(u,v)
i ≤ (1 + 2δ)
−1E
[
k∑
i=1
x
(u,v)
i
]]
≤ Pr
[
k∑
i=1
x
(u,v)
i ≤ (1− δ)E
[
k∑
i=1
x
(u,v)
i
]]
≤ e−
δ2
2
(1/2+δ)k ≤ e−
δ2
4
k ≤
1
n3
,
where we used that (1 + 2δ)−1 = 1− 2δ(1 + 2δ)−1 ≤ 1− δ in the third step.
If T fails to identify S, then there exists (u ∈ S, v ∈ V − S) such that
∑k
i=1 x
(u,v)
i ≤ k/2. As
there are at most |S||V − S| ≤ n2 such (u, v) pairs to consider, by the union bound,
Pr [T identifies S] ≥ 1−
∑
u∈S,v∈V−S
Pr
[
k∑
i=1
x
(u,v)
i ≤ k/2
]
> 1− 1/n> 0.
Thus, if S is a δ-stable harmonious communities, then there exists a multi-set T ⊂ V of size
12 log n/δ2 that identifies S. We can thus enumerate all δ-stable harmonious communities by
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enumerating all (T, t) pairs, where T ranges from all multi-subsets of V of size 12 log n/δ2 and
t ∈ [1 : n] and check if T can identify a set of size t.
7 Remarks
While the results of this paper are conceptual and are built on the abstract framework of
preference networks, we hope this study is a significant step towards developing a rigorous theory
of community formation in social and information networks. In particular, we hope this will
be used to inform and choose among other approaches to community identification which have
been developed. Below we discuss a few short-term research directions that may help to expand
our understanding in order to make more effective connection with community identification in
networks that arise in practice.
Preferences Models
We have based our community formation theory on the ordinal concept of utilities used in social
choice and modern economic theory [2]. The resulting preference network framework, like that
in the classic studies of voting [2] and stable marriage [7], enables our axiomatic approach to
focus on the conceptual question of network communities rather than the more practical question
of community formation in an observed social network. To better connect with the real-world
community identification problem, we need to loosen both the assumption of strict ranking and
the assumption of complete preference information.
With simple modifications to our axioms, we can extend our entire theory to a preference
network A = (V,Π) that allows indifferences, i.e., Π is given by n ordered partitions {pi1, ..., pin} :
pii ∈ L(V ). This extension enables us to partially expand our results to affinity networks. Recall
an affinity network A = (V,W ) is given by n vectors W = {w1, ..., wn}, where wi is an n-place
non-negative vectors. We can extract an ordinal preference pii ∈ L(V ) from the cardinal affinities
by sorting entries in wi – elements with the same weight are assigned to the same partition.
Although this conversion may lose some valuable affinity information encoded in the numer-
ical values, it offers a path for us to apply our community theory – even in its current form –
to network analysis. For example, as suggested in [3], given a social network G = (V,E), we
can first define an affinity network A = (V,W ) where wi is the personalized PageRank vector of
vertex i, and then obtain an preference network (V,Π) where pi ∈ L(V ) ranks vertices in V by
i’s PageRank contributions [1] to them.
Theoretically, we would like to extend our work to preference networks with partially or-
dered preferences as a concrete step to understand community formation in networks with in-
complete or incomparable preferences. Like our current study, we believe that the existing
literature in social choice – e.g., [16] – will be valuable to our understanding. We expect that
an axiomatic community approach to preference networks with partially ordered preferences,
together with an axiomatization theory of personalized ranking in a network, may offer us new
understanding of how to address the two basic mathematical problems – extension of individ-
ual affinities/preferences to community coherence and inference of missing links – for studying
communities in a social and information network. As this part of community theory becomes
sufficiently well developed, well-designed experiments with real-world social networks will be
necessary to further enhance this theoretical framework.
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Structures, Algorithms, and Complexity
Our taxonomy theorem provides the basic structure of communities in a preference network,
while the coNP-Completeness result illustrates the algorithmic challenges for community iden-
tification in addition to community enumeration. On the other hand, our analysis of the har-
monious rule and the work of [3] seem to suggest some efficient notion of communities can be
defined.
However, it remains an open question if there exists a natural and constructive community
rule that simultaneously (i) satisfies all axioms, (ii) allows overlapping communities, and (iii)
has stable communities which are polynomial-time samplable and enumerable.
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